9780199250370 - Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action de Schueler, G. F. (25 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: Near Fine. 1st Edition. In the dust jacket.

Hardcover. Condición: As New. Hardcover with jacket. New book with minimal shelf wear. Never read. Pages are clean and unmarked.

Condición: Very Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Couverture rigide. Condición: Assez bon. SCHUELER (G.-F.). Reasons and Purposes. Human rationality and the teleological explanation of action. Oxford, 2003, in-8°, cart. pl. toile, ss. jaq., qq. annot. au crayon.

Condición: Very good.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Hardback. Condición: New. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.

Condición: New. People act for reasons. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what the author investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Num Pages: 192 pages, bibliography. BIC Classification: HPC; HPM; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 223 x 144 x 15. Weight in Grams: 341. . 2003. hardcover. . . . .

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. People act for reasons. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what the author investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Num Pages: 192 pages, bibliography. BIC Classification: HPC; HPM; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 223 x 144 x 15. Weight in Grams: 341. . 2003. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardback. Condición: New. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.

Hardcover. Condición: Like New. Like New. book.

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out twoessential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherentlynormative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. What is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out twoessential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherentlynormative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. What is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out twoessential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherentlynormative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. What is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 192.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 192 44:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Reasons and Purposes | Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action | G. F. Schueler | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2003 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199250370 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 192.

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons.