Isbn: 9780199204182 - how we act: causes, reasons, and intentions (24 resultados)

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Condición: New. Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions. This book portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. It presents a picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. Num Pages: 268 pages, 16 figures. BIC Classification: HPJ; HPM; JMR. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UF) Further/Higher Education. Dimension: 215 x 135 x 20. Weight in Grams: 349. . 2006. Paperback. . . . .…

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Condición: New. Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions. This book portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. It presents a picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. Num Pages: 268 pages, 16 figures. BIC Classification: HPJ; HPM; JMR. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UF) Further/Higher Education. Dimension: 215 x 135 x 20. Weight in Grams: 349. . 2006. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. How We Act presents a compelling picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. Berent Enc eschews any appeal to special capacities supposedly unique to rational agents, such as agent causation or irreducible acts of volition, and by appealing to analogous positions in epistemology and the theory of perception, shows why it is a mistake to subscribe to such capacities.Although aspects of the causal theory of action have beenadopted and defended by many empiricist philosophers, none has given as sustained and as thorough a defence as Enc offers in this book. His defence begins with a foundationalist definition of action that rests on atheory of basic acts, conceived here as derived from empirical studies of animal behaviour. Basic acts are complex units that agents acquire as part of their repertoire of things they can readily do - things with which practical syllogisms end.Having set out the details of his causal theory, Enc proceeds to propose solutions for two remaining problems. The first is a general and a complete solution to the problem of the so-called deviant causal chains. The second is a solutionto the problem of "the disappearance of the agent". The causal theory presents the agent as a mere conduit for a causal chain - the agent seems to lose its active role. This problem is addressed bycontrasting hard-wired and conditioned behaviour with behaviour that is the result of deliberation, and a purely causal model of deliberative reasoning is provided.How We Act is careful to allay fears that its causal theory threatens our common-sense notion that we act of our own free will, but it remains highly provocative and original. Anyone working on human action, in philosophy and also in cognitive and behavioural psychology, will find much to stimulate themhere. Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions. This book portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. It presents a picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. How We Act presents a compelling picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. Berent Enc eschews any appeal to special capacities supposedly unique to rational agents, such as agent causation or irreducible acts of volition, and by appealing to analogous positions in epistemology and the theory of perception, shows why it is a mistake to subscribe to such capacities.Although aspects of the causal theory of action have beenadopted and defended by many empiricist philosophers, none has given as sustained and as thorough a defence as Enc offers in this book. His defence begins with a foundationalist definition of action that rests on atheory of basic acts, conceived here as derived from empirical studies of animal behaviour. Basic acts are complex units that agents acquire as part of their repertoire of things they can readily do - things with which practical syllogisms end.Having set out the details of his causal theory, Enc proceeds to propose solutions for two remaining problems. The first is a general and a complete solution to the problem of the so-called deviant causal chains. The second is a solutionto the problem of "the disappearance of the agent". The causal theory presents the agent as a mere conduit for a causal chain - the agent seems to lose its active role. This problem is addressed bycontrasting hard-wired and conditioned behaviour with behaviour that is the result of deliberation, and a purely causal model of deliberative reasoning is provided.How We Act is careful to allay fears that its causal theory threatens our common-sense notion that we act of our own free will, but it remains highly provocative and original. Anyone working on human action, in philosophy and also in cognitive and behavioural psychology, will find much to stimulate themhere. Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions. This book portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. It presents a picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. How We Act presents a compelling picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. Berent Enc eschews any appeal to special capacities supposedly unique to rational agents, such as agent causation or irreducible acts of volition, and by appealing to analogous positions in epistemology and the theory of perception, shows why it is a mistake to subscribe to such capacities.Although aspects of the causal theory of action have beenadopted and defended by many empiricist philosophers, none has given as sustained and as thorough a defence as Enc offers in this book. His defence begins with a foundationalist definition of action that rests on atheory of basic acts, conceived here as derived from empirical studies of animal behaviour. Basic acts are complex units that agents acquire as part of their repertoire of things they can readily do - things with which practical syllogisms end.Having set out the details of his causal theory, Enc proceeds to propose solutions for two remaining problems. The first is a general and a complete solution to the problem of the so-called deviant causal chains. The second is a solutionto the problem of "the disappearance of the agent". The causal theory presents the agent as a mere conduit for a causal chain - the agent seems to lose its active role. This problem is addressed bycontrasting hard-wired and conditioned behaviour with behaviour that is the result of deliberation, and a purely causal model of deliberative reasoning is provided.How We Act is careful to allay fears that its causal theory threatens our common-sense notion that we act of our own free will, but it remains highly provocative and original. Anyone working on human action, in philosophy and also in cognitive and behavioural psychology, will find much to stimulate themhere. Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions. This book portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. It presents a picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions. This book portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new accounts of intention and voluntary ac.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. How We ACT | Causes, Reasons, and Intentions | Berent En C. (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2006 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199204182 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Postfach:81 03 40, 70567 Stuttgart, vertrieb[at]dbg[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …