ISBN: 9780197862148 - the problem of "the world" (3 resultados)

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  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 2026

    0197862144 / 9780197862148

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    Librería: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaGrand Eagle Retail

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 136,38

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponible

    Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Contemporary analytic philosophy abounds with invocations of something called 'the world' (or, similarly, 'reality'); but, Avner Baz argues, it is none too clear what is meant by 'the world' in such invocations. The Problem of "The World" demonstrates case by case-from the metaphysics of magnitudes, through cognitive science, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, all the way to metaethics-that those invocations of 'the world' are meant to refer tothe world as captured or reflected in our objective representations-paradigmatically, but not exclusively, those of the natural sciences-when those representations are true. At the same time, however, thephilosophers making them take that world-as thus captured or reflected-to be altogether independent of our representations of it, and hence independent as well of the conditions under which those representations have whatever sense they have for us. These philosophers thus reveal themselves as transcendental realists, in Kant's sense.Drawing on Kant, but revising and expanding his ideas under the inspiration of (the Later) Wittgenstein, Cora Diamond, Merleau-Ponty, andStanley Cavell, Baz argues that transcendental realism ultimately amounts to no more than an empty gesture. At the same time, his critique of transcendental realism has a positive, transcendentalidealist upshot: it reveals our sense-making as conditioned, or situated, and shows that, and how, philosophers get themselves in philosophical trouble when they try to hold on to sense apart from its (worldly-historical) conditions. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Inc, 2026

    0197862144 / 9780197862148

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    Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 159,96

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    Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles

    Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 296 pages. 5.98x0.96x8.29 inches. In Stock.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Okt 2026, 2026

    0197862144 / 9780197862148

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    Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 162,38

    Envío por EUR 35,00 
    Se envía de Alemania a Estados Unidos de America

    Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles

    Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Contemporary analytic philosophy abounds with invocations of something called 'the world' (or, similarly, 'reality'); but, Avner Baz argues, it is none too clear what is meant by 'the world' in such invocations. The Problem of 'The World' demonstrates case by case-from the metaphysics of magnitudes, through cognitive science, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, all the way to metaethics-that those invocations of 'the world' are meant to refer to the world as captured or reflected in our objective representations-paradigmatically, but not exclusively, those of the natural sciences-when those representations are true. At the same time, however, the philosophers making them take that world-as thus captured or reflected-to be altogether independent of our representations of it, and hence independent as well of the conditions under which those representations have whatever sense they have for us. These philosophers thus reveal themselves as transcendental realists, in Kant's sense. Drawing on Kant, but revising and expanding his ideas under the inspiration of (the Later) Wittgenstein, Cora Diamond, Merleau-Ponty, and Stanley Cavell, Baz argues that transcendental realism ultimately amounts to no more than an empty gesture. At the same time, his critique of transcendental realism has a positive, transcendental idealist upshot: it reveals our sense-making as conditioned, or situated, and shows that, and how, philosophers get themselves in philosophical trouble when they try to hold on to sense apart from its (worldly-historical) conditions.…