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Paperback. Condición: New.

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Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book argues that the hard problem of consciousness is epistemological, perspectival, and resolvable, rather than ontological and irresolvable. The brain as we see and otherwise sense it is the reality as known rather than the reality as such. If the same is true of our conscious experiences, it becomes possible that the hard problem is epistemological and resolvable. Conscious experiences may be ontologically reducible to certain brain states but have knowledge content that, for purely perspectival reasons, is epistemologically irreducible to an outside observer's knowledge of the brain states. If so, there is no hard problem, no explanatory gap. Everything about a conscious experience, including its irreducible knowledge content, is subsumed within the reality known to an outside observer as a brain state and everything about it - including why it is 'like this' and why it is 'like anything' - can be identified and explained in externally observed terms. (The brain states should be unique in ways that will make the resulting accounts plausible and satisfactory.). We need not explain how the brain states transform themselves into the conscious experiences. This does not happen, except through a shift in perspective. A particular conscious experience and brain state are simply the same physical thing known in irreconcilably different ways. A full account of a given conscious experience and brain state consists of a full external observer's explanation of the brain state mapped to our irreducible inner view of what the conscious experience is like (relatively trivial information but essential to a complete account). This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condición: New.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book argues that the hard problem of consciousness is epistemological, perspectival, and resolvable, rather than ontological and irresolvable. The brain as we see and otherwise sense it is the reality as known rather than the reality as such. If the same is true of our conscious experiences, it becomes possible that the hard problem is epistemological and resolvable. Conscious experiences may be ontologically reducible to certain brain states but have knowledge content that, for purely perspectival reasons, is epistemologically irreducible to an outside observer's knowledge of the brain states. If so, there is no hard problem, no explanatory gap. Everything about a conscious experience, including its irreducible knowledge content, is subsumed within the reality known to an outside observer as a brain state and everything about it - including why it is 'like this' and why it is 'like anything' - can be identified and explained in externally observed terms. (The brain states should be unique in ways that will make the resulting accounts plausible and satisfactory.). We need not explain how the brain states transform themselves into the conscious experiences. This does not happen, except through a shift in perspective. A particular conscious experience and brain state are simply the same physical thing known in irreconcilably different ways. A full account of a given conscious experience and brain state consists of a full external observer's explanation of the brain state mapped to our irreducible inner view of what the conscious experience is like (relatively trivial information but essential to a complete account).…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book argues that the hard problem of consciousness is epistemological, perspectival, and resolvable, rather than ontological and irresolvable. The brain as we see and otherwise sense it is the reality as known rather than the reality as such. If the same is true of our conscious experiences, it becomes possible that the hard problem is epistemological and resolvable. Conscious experiences may be ontologically reducible to certain brain states but have knowledge content that, for purely perspectival reasons, is epistemologically irreducible to an outside observer's knowledge of the brain states. If so, there is no hard problem, no explanatory gap. Everything about a conscious experience, including its irreducible knowledge content, is subsumed within the reality known to an outside observer as a brain state and everything about it - including why it is 'like this' and why it is 'like anything' - can be identified and explained in externally observed terms. (The brain states should be unique in ways that will make the resulting accounts plausible and satisfactory.). We need not explain how the brain states transform themselves into the conscious experiences. This does not happen, except through a shift in perspective. A particular conscious experience and brain state are simply the same physical thing known in irreconcilably different ways. A full account of a given conscious experience and brain state consists of a full external observer's explanation of the brain state mapped to our irreducible inner view of what the conscious experience is like (relatively trivial information but essential to a complete account). This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book argues that the hard problem of consciousness is epistemological, perspectival, and resolvable, rather than ontological and irresolvable. The brain as we see and otherwise sense it is the reality as known rather than the reality as such. If the same is true of our conscious experiences, it becomes possible that the hard problem is epistemological and resolvable. Conscious experiences may be ontologically reducible to certain brain states but have knowledge content that, for purely perspectival reasons, is epistemologically irreducible to an outside observer's knowledge of the brain states. If so, there is no hard problem, no explanatory gap. Everything about a conscious experience, including its irreducible knowledge content, is subsumed within the reality known to an outside observer as a brain state and everything about it - including why it is 'like this' and why it is 'like anything' - can be identified and explained in externally observed terms. (The brain states should be unique in ways that will make the resulting accounts plausible and satisfactory.). We need not explain how the brain states transform themselves into the conscious experiences. This does not happen, except through a shift in perspective. A particular conscious experience and brain state are simply the same physical thing known in irreconcilably different ways. A full account of a given conscious experience and brain state consists of a full external observer's explanation of the brain state mapped to our irreducible inner view of what the conscious experience is like (relatively trivial information but essential to a complete account). This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - What if the simple application of logic to some of the more obvious facets of human psychology offers the best path to enlightenment, transcendence, and realising our true nature What if it is also a key step in the development of a coherent science of experience and behaviour This book offers support for both suggestions. A shorter, more accessible and informal follow-up to Nicholson's Self, Consciousness, and Being: The Transcendent Perspective, it presents a less complex presentation of the same basic case in its 208 pages, offering new insights and clarifications and an easier read in the process.The core argument is the same. We should use the mental exercises provided to replace the limited and restrictive self-views we acquire incidentally as we develop with the transcendent self-view - a perspective on the self that transcends ideas and viewpoints generally, seeing and treating them as subordinate facets of a total self that has empty consciousness, the underlying essence of consciousness itself, as its (arguably Zen-like) resting focus and core.The result of adopting this self-view may be thought of as personal transcendence and even given a spiritual slant. However, it is best seen as an everyday kind of transcendence that is really nothing special - just a psycho-logically defensible and sensible endpoint to our inner development we should all arguably aspire to.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. What if the simple application of logic to some of the more obvious facets of human psychology offers the best path to enlightenment, transcendence, and realising our true nature? What if it is also a key step in the development of a coherent science of experience and behaviour? This book offers support for both suggestions. A shorter, more accessible and informal follow-up to Nicholson's Self, Consciousness, and Being: The Transcendent Perspective, it presents a less complex presentation of the same basic case in its 208 pages, offering new insights and clarifications and an easier read in the process.The core argument is the same. We should use the mental exercises provided to replace the limited and restrictive self-views we acquire incidentally as we develop with the transcendent self-view - a perspective on the self that transcends ideas and viewpoints generally, seeing and treating them as subordinate facets of a total self that has empty consciousness, the underlying essence of consciousness itself, as its (arguably Zen-like) resting focus and core.The result of adopting this self-view may be thought of as personal transcendence and even given a spiritual slant. However, it is best seen as an everyday kind of transcendence that is really nothing special - just a psycho-logically defensible and sensible endpoint to our inner development we should all arguably aspire to. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. The Hard Problem of Consciousness Resolved | Dennis Nicholson | Taschenbuch | Englisch | 2026 | UmBla | EAN 9798235470804 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Everyday Transcendence | The Way of Psychology | Dennis Nicholson | Taschenbuch | Englisch | 2026 | UmBla | EAN 9798233596896 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.