konigstein manfred (13 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Gut. 197 S. : graph. Darst. ; 24 cm Ex.-Libr., Good condition. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 300.

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Sehr gut. 197 Seiten ex Library Book aus einer wissenschaftlichen Bibliothek Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 282.

Softcover. 197 S. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. L07641 9783540669555 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 460.

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Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 209 pages. 9.25x6.00x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the 'pie' is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that 'advance production' compared to 'no pro duction' should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production | Manfred Königstein | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | xii | Englisch | 2000 | Springer | EAN 9783540669555 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extrasResult 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the 'pie' is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that 'advance production' compared to 'no pro duction' should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 216 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the 'pie' is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that 'advance production' compared to 'no pro duction' should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining. 216 pp. Englisch.