Librería: Antiquariat Bookfarm, Löbnitz, Alemania
EUR 19,00
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoEhem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. Sj 779 3540184295 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.
Librería: Zubal-Books, Since 1961, Cleveland, OH, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 26,62
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: Good. 127 pp., Paperback, ex library, else text clean and binding tight. - If you are reading this, this item is actually (physically) in our stock and ready for shipment once ordered. We are not bookjackers. Buyer is responsible for any additional duties, taxes, or fees required by recipient's country.
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
EUR 58,52
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. In.
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987
ISBN 10: 3540184295 ISBN 13: 9783540184294
Idioma: Inglés
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
EUR 53,49
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Librería: Buchpark, Trebbin, Alemania
EUR 53,07
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: Gut. Zustand: Gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher.
Librería: Chiron Media, Wallingford, Reino Unido
EUR 56,54
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 10 disponibles
Añadir al carritoPF. Condición: New.
Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 74,52
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. pp. 140.
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
EUR 76,44
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoPaperback. Condición: Brand New. reprint edition. 137 pages. 9.60x6.60x0.32 inches. In Stock.
Librería: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 52,45
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987
ISBN 10: 3540184295 ISBN 13: 9783540184294
Idioma: Inglés
Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
EUR 48,37
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisio.
Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
EUR 77,14
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Print on Demand pp. 140 67:B&W 6.69 x 9.61 in or 244 x 170 mm (Pinched Crown) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Springer Berlin Heidelberg Okt 1987, 1987
ISBN 10: 3540184295 ISBN 13: 9783540184294
Idioma: Inglés
Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemania
EUR 53,49
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Inhaltsangabe 1 The Purification Problem in the Game-Theoretic Context.- 1.1 A constrained game with incomplete information.- 1.2 The purification problem.- 1.3 On existence of approximate purifications.- 1.4 Some topological properties of the set of strategies concentrated on a correspondence.- 1.5 Theorems on existence of an equilibrium.- 1.6 On existence of pure strategy equilibrium.- 1.7 Determining approximately payoff-equivalent pure strategies.- 2 A Market Game as a Game with Incomplete Information.- 2.1 A model of a market game with a continuum of traders.- 2.2 On the connection between core, r-core and the set of r-Walras allocations.- 3 Some Applications to Statistical Decision Theory.- 3.1 Minimax decision rules.- 3.2 Set-valued minimax estimators.- Appensdix.- References.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 140 pp. Englisch.
Librería: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Alemania
EUR 80,81
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 140.
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg Okt 1987, 1987
ISBN 10: 3540184295 ISBN 13: 9783540184294
Idioma: Inglés
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
EUR 96,29
Convertir monedaCantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach. 140 pp. Englisch.