The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information

Helmut Meister

ISBN 10: 3540184295 ISBN 13: 9783540184294

Editorial: Springer, 1987

Idioma: Ingl�s

Condici�n: Nuevo Encuadernaci�n de tapa blanda

Guardar para m�s tarde

Vendido por Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America

Vendedor de AbeBooks desde 22 de noviembre de 2018

Calificaci�n del vendedor: 4 de 5 estrellas

Ver los art�culos de este vendedor

Ver todos los ejemplares de este libro

Nuevos - Encuadernaci�n de tapa blanda

Condici�n: Nuevo

Precio: EUR 73,97 Convertir moneda

EUR 9,83 gastos de env�o desde Estados Unidos de America a Espa�a Destinos, gastos y plazos de env�o

Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles

A�adir al carrito

Guardar para m�s tarde

Descripci�n

pp. 140.

N� de ref. del art�culo 2648020866

Contactar al vendedor

Denunciar este art�culo

Detalles bibliogr�ficos

T�tulo: The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information
Editor: Springer
Fecha de publicaci�n: 1987
Idioma: Ingl�s
ISBN 10: 3540184295
ISBN 13: 9783540184294
Encuadernaci�n: Encuadernaci�n de tapa blanda
Estado: New

Acerca de

Sinopsis

The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.

Rese�a del editor

The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.

"Sobre este t�tulo" puede pertenecer a otra edici�n de este libro.

Descripci�n de la librer�a

I mainly carry imported books from South East Asia / South Asia for readers of all Age Groups.

Ver la p�gina web de la librer�a

Informaci�n empresarial del vendedor

PLETOS INC
6931 51st Avenue, WOODSIDE, Woodside, NY, 11377, U.S.A.

Condiciones de venta y env�o

Condiciones de venta

We accept return for those books which are received damamged. Though we take appropriate care in packaing to avoid such situation.

Condiciones de env�o

M�todos de pago

A�adir una petici�n