9783957430342 - logic, language, and the liar paradox de pleitz, martin (6 resultados)
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Librería: Walden Books, London, , Reino UnidoWalden Books
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Paperback. Condición: Very Good. Card covers are lightly shelf-marked, corners bumped; spine is creased and bumped; binding is tight; pages are crisp, first page of chapter one has previous owner's ink annotations, all others appear unmarked. Revising notions of truth and logic, a very good copy. ; 6 x 1.5 x 9 inches; 651 pages.
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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like This sentence is not true certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar s…entence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Goedelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox | Martin Pleitz | Taschenbuch | 651 S. | Englisch | 2018 | Brill Mentis GmbH | EAN 9783957430342 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Brill Deutschland GmbH, Wollmarktstr. 115, 33098 Paderborn, productsafety[at]degruyterbrill[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Lia…r sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.
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Librería: AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, AustraliaAussieBookSeller
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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like This sentence is not true certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar s…entence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Goedelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
