Isbn: 9783631385746 - capital structure, managerial incentives and corporate governance: 9 (entwicklung und finanzierung) (7 resultados)

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  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Frankfurt am Main: Lang., 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: Antiquariat Thomas Haker GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin, AlemaniaAntiquariat Thomas Haker GmbH & Co. KG

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    EUR 12,00

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles

    Paperback. Condición: Gut. 203 p., with figures, Good condition. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 385.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Peter Lang, Peter Lang, 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 73,25

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    Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - What factors determine a firm's financing decision Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Peter Lang, 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: preigu, Osnabrück, Alemaniapreigu

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 73,25

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    Cantidad disponible: 5 disponibles

    Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Capital Structure, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance | Christian Pfeil | Taschenbuch | Entwicklung und Finanzierung | Englisch | 2002 | Peter Lang | EAN 9783631385746 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Lang, Peter GmbH, Gontardstr. 11, 10178 Berlin, r[dot]boehm-korff[at]peterlang[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissen, 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Reino UnidoMispah books

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    Condición: Nuevo

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles

    paperback. Condición: New. NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Peter Lang, 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, AlemaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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    Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles

    Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -What factors determine a firm's financing decision Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective. 204 pp. Englisch.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Peter Lang, 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemaniamoluna

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    Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. What factors determine a firm s financing decision? Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on the.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Peter Lang, Peter Lang Apr 2002, 2002

    3631385749 / 9783631385746

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    Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemaniabuchversandmimpf2000

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 73,25

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    Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -What factors determine a firm's financing decision Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective.Lang, Peter GmbH, Gontardstraße 11, 10178 Berlin 204 pp. Englisch.