9780691134697 - Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries de Tomz, Michael (18 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Very Good. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

Paperback. Condición: Used-Very Good. Pap. Minor shelf wear. Crease across top corner of front wrap, first few leaves. Spine lightly toned. Else a bright, clean copy.

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Paperback. Condición: New. How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt.His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: New. 2007. Paperback. How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? This book attempts to answer this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. It explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Num Pages: 328 pages, 16 line illus. 27 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; JPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 234 x 159 x 20. Weight in Grams: 508. . . . . .

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: New. 2007. Paperback. How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? This book attempts to answer this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. It explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Num Pages: 328 pages, 16 line illus. 27 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; JPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 234 x 159 x 20. Weight in Grams: 508. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

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Paperback. Condición: Brand New. illustrated edition. 328 pages. 9.00x6.00x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condición: New. How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt.His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. illustrated edition. 328 pages. 9.00x6.00x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? This book attempts to answer this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. It explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investor.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Reputation and International Cooperation | Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries | Michael Tomz | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | 2007 | Princeton University Press | EAN 9780691134697 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment.Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible.Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.