michael richard starks (11 resultados)

Condición: New.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New.

Condición: New. Print on Demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware.

Paperback / softback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at leastserves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merelyphilosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politicsetc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgensteinand others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 andunconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes.I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent studentsof behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structureof intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein'sfundamental discovery -that all truly 'philosophical' problems are the same-confusionsabout how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same-lookingat how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditionsof Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but onecannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in avery specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the modernperspective of the two systems of thought (popularized as 'thinking fast, thinking slow'), employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I show thatthis is a powerful heuristic for describing behavior. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serve s as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes. Language is programmed in our genes and is involved in nearly all our social behavior. Philosophy in the str ict sense (i.e., academic philosophy), is as Wittgenstein showed us, the study of the way language is used (language games) and I regard it as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (i.e., pretty much everything involving language which is ofte n called System 2 or slow thinking). However, as I hope I have shown in my writings over the last decade, nonlinguistic behavior or System 1 or fast thinking is also described with language and this leads to endless confusion which I have tried to clarify here and which is summarized in the tables that I present. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.