mcmurphy michael (28 resultados)

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Condición: New. KlappentextrnrnLeveraging technology for a competitive advantage is a crucial element of the US Army s future. New US Army doctrinal concepts utilize technology to gain information superiority in unprecedented fashion. Information superiority be.

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Leveraging technology for a competitive advantage is a crucial element of the US Army's future. New US Army doctrinal concepts utilize technology to gain information superiority in unprecedented fashion. Information superiority becomes a decisive point for attaining mission accomplishment. The information system employed by future US Army organizations is the means of achieving information superiority. Outsourcing provides a means of leveraging technology for an advantage. Outsourcing is so successful that it has created its own industry in the 1990s. The Department of Defense capitalizes on the advantages of outsourcing to gain significant benefits. The question that this monograph answers is whether a Light Infantry Division should outsource all, or a part of, its information system. The monograph examines extending the outsourcing trend to a Light Infantry Division to see if there is a limit in replacing signal soldiers and military equipment with contractors. The monograph answers this question by using an analytical model that is recommended by information management professionals in the private sector. Examination begins by identifying the relevance of outsourcing to the US military. Next, the monograph introduces a core identification model used by information system professionals to analyze outsourcing decisions. The monograph identifies the components of the Light Infantry Division's information system and then analyzes the components within the context of the identification model. The monograph concludes that outsourcing will gain an ever increasing role in the Light Infantry Division. Outsourcing will leverage near-term advantages for the division during crisis response scenarios. Outsourcing will also assist in obtaining information superiority for the future experimental Light Infantry Division design.

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Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - OPERATION ALLIED FORCE has become a lightning rod sparking strong debate within the US military. The debate revolves around the subject of decisive military action and which branch of service most contributed to the successful campaign in Kosovo. Air power enthusiasts proclaim operations in Kosovo as further vindication of the supremacy of air power. Land power enthusiasts posit that it was the contribution of land power that delivered the decisive blow in Kosovo. Useful lessons learned are obscured by parochial diatribe. Anachronistic debate between the two polarized communities obscures insight into OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Operations in Kosovo require a new perspective in which to examine actions and extract useful lessons learned. The best perspective for doing so is from the standpoint of coercion strategy. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a coercion campaign. During a coercion campaign, the military simply backs diplomacy with force. That force is measured and applied to achieve limited and quantifiable results. Coercion does not require decisive military force. The question that this monograph answers is does land power provide a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion. An examination of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE from the perspective of coercion develops a deeper understanding of coercion strategy. It reveals empirical data from historical examples, explores coercion's role in US military doctrine, and reveals useful lessons learned while simultaneously discarding the dogmatic arguments of air and land power enthusiasts. The monograph concludes that land power is relevant in coercion campaigns. Success or failure of land power in one situation will not necessarily predict the same result in other situations. However, because coercion holds a pivotal role in United States foreign policy, the US Army should re-examine its role in a non-decisive sense in order to back diplomacy with limited power.

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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 62.

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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 62.

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Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 62.

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE has become a lightning rod sparking strong debate within the US military. The debate revolves around the subject of decisive military action and which branch of service most contributed to the successful campaign in Kosovo. Air power enthusiasts proclaim operations in Kosovo as further vindication of the supremacy of air power. Land power enthusiasts posit that it was the contribution of land power that delivered the decisive blow in Kosovo. Useful lessons learned are obscured by parochial diatribe. Anachronistic debate between the two polarized communities obscures insight into OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Operations in Kosovo require a new perspective in which to examine actions and extract useful lessons learned. The best perspective for doing so is from the standpoint of coercion strategy. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a coercion campaign. During a coercion campaign, the military simply backs diplomacy with force. That force is measured and applied to achieve limited and quantifiable results. Coercion does not require decisive military force. The question that this monograph answers is does land power provide a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion. An examination of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE from the perspective of coercion develops a deeper understanding of coercion strategy. It reveals empirical data from historical examples, explores coercion's role in US military doctrine, and reveals useful lessons learned while simultaneously discarding the dogmatic arguments of air and land power enthusiasts. The monograph concludes that land power is relevant in coercion campaigns. Success or failure of land power in one situation will not necessarily predict the same result in other situations. However, because coercion holds a pivotal role in United States foreign policy, the US Army should re-examine its role in a non-decisive sense in order to back diplomacy with limited power.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 74.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE has become a lightning rod sparking strong debate within the US military. The debate revolves around the subject of decisive military action and which branch of service most contributed to the successful campaign in Kosovo. Air power enthusiasts proclaim operations in Kosovo as further vindication of the supremacy of air power. Land power enthusiasts posit that it was the contribution of land power that delivered the decisive blow in Kosovo. Useful lessons learned are obscured by parochial diatribe. Anachronistic debate between the two polarized communities obscures insight into OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Operations in Kosovo require a new perspective in which to examine actions and extract useful lessons learned. The best perspective for doing so is from the standpoint of coercion strategy. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a coercion campaign. During a coercion campaign, the military simply backs diplomacy with force. That force is measured and applied to achieve limited and quantifiable results. Coercion does not require decisive military force. The question that this monograph answers is does land power provide a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion. An examination of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE from the perspective of coercion develops a deeper understanding of coercion strategy. It reveals empirical data from historical examples, explores coercion's role in US military doctrine, and reveals useful lessons learned while simultaneously discarding the dogmatic arguments of air and land power enthusiasts. The monograph concludes that land power is relevant in coercion campaigns. Success or failure of land power in one situation will not necessarily predict the same result in other situations. However, because coercion holds a pivotal role in United States foreign policy, the US Army should re-examine its role in a non-decisive sense in order to back diplomacy with limited power.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.