houba harold (25 resultados)

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. pp. 344.

Condición: New. pp. 344.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Credible Threats in Negotiations | A Game-theoretic Approach | Harold Houba (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | xxii | Englisch | 2011 | Humana | EAN 9781441953049 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Condición: New. pp. 344.

Condición: New. Discusses the relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome and relates to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. This work is suitable for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and also for scholars interested in bargaining situations. Series: Theory and Decision Library C. Num Pages: 342 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KC; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 20. Weight in Grams: 1450. . 2002. 2002nd Edition. hardcover. . . . .

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation's announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation's announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2.

Condición: New. Discusses the relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome and relates to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. This work is suitable for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and also for scholars interested in bargaining situations. Series: Theory and Decision Library C. Num Pages: 342 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KC; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 20. Weight in Grams: 1450. . 2002. 2002nd Edition. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardcover. Condición: Like New. Like New. book.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

orig. wrappers. Condición: Minor wear. VG. 24x16cm, viii,224 pp, Katholieke Universiteit Brabant doctoral thesis.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation's announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2. 344 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation's announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2. 344 pp. Englisch.

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Harold Houba is economist at the Centre of World Food Studies, Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. He was educated at Tilburg University, both Masters and Ph.D. and has been Assistant Professor of Economic Theory for about ten years at the department .

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Harold Houba is economist at the Centre of World Food Studies, Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. He was educated at Tilburg University, both Masters and Ph.D. and has been Assistant Professor of Economic Theory for about ten years at the department .

Buch. Condición: Neu. Credible Threats in Negotiations | A Game-theoretic Approach | Harold Houba (u. a.) | Buch | Theory and Decision Library C | xxii | Englisch | 2002 | Springer | EAN 9781402071836 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation¿s announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 344 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with an emphasize on the role of threats in the negotiation process. Threats are all actions outside the negotiation room that negotiators have ate their disposal and the use of these actions affect the bargaining position of all negotiators. Of course, each negotiator aims to strengthen his own position. Examples of threats are the announcement of a strike by a union in centralized wage bargaining, or a nation¿s announcement of a trade war directed against other nations in negotiations for trade liberalization. This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats. Also on the technical level, negotiations with variable threats build on and extend the techniques applied in analyzing bargaining situations without threats. The first part of this book, containing chapter 3-6, presents the no-threat case, and the second part, containing chapter 7-10, extends the analysis for negotiation situations where threats are present. A consistent and unifying framework is provided first in 2.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 344 pp. Englisch.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 344.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 344 Illus.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 344.