frise matthew (17 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views. This Element examines many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends on the past. Just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 75 pages. 6.00x0.14x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Condición: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condición: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . .

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views. This Element examines many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends on the past. Just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views.

Paperback. Condición: New. In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 75 pages. 6.00x0.25x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Condición: New. 2026. hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condición: New. 2026. hardcover. . . . . .

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views. This Element examines many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends on the past. Just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Condición: new. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this book I examine many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends, in part or primarily, on the past. I reject this view, arguing that just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. Another traditional view is that our justification from memory is best accounted for by theories on which justification directly depends on features of the world external to the mind. I argue that the mental life suffices to account for memory justification. I then appeal to the tip of the tongue phenomenon to argue that just a portion of the mental matters for memory justification: what the subject internally accesses. The best epistemology of memory turns out to support a package of extreme and untraditional views. This Element examines many philosophical theories that attempt to explain the epistemological limits and powers of memory. A traditional view is that our epistemic justification from memory in the present directly depends on the past. Just the way the present is directly matters for the justification we have from memory now. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.