There are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin and group selection, punishment and reputation mechanisms, or network reciprocity. This last one will be the center of the present study.
The thesis explores the interface between the underlying structure of a given population and the outcome of the cooperative dynamics taking place on top of it, (namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled.
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There are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin and group selection, punishment and reputation mechanisms, or network reciprocity. This last one will be the center of the present study.
The thesis explores the interface between the underlying structure of a given population and the outcome of the cooperative dynamics taking place on top of it, (namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled.
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Librería: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italia
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Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -There are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin and group selection, punishment and reputation mechanisms, or network reciprocity. This last one will be the center of the present study. The thesis explores the interface between the underlying structure of a given population and the outcome of the cooperative dynamics taking place on top of it, (namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled. 172 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783642301162
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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Gives important insights into the emergence and evolution of cooperation Interdisciplinary topic of interest to physicists, mathematicians and life scientists Nominated as an outstanding contribution by the University of ZaragozaThere ar. Nº de ref. del artículo: 5056141
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Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -There are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin and group selection, punishment and reputation mechanisms, or network reciprocity. This last one will be the center of the present study.The thesis explores the interface between the underlying structure of a given population and the outcome of the cooperative dynamics taking place on top of it, (namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 172 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783642301162
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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 172 87 Illus. (16 Col.). Nº de ref. del artículo: 55072916
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Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 172. Nº de ref. del artículo: 1854519617
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