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Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study: 440 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 440) - Tapa blanda

Libro 68 de 126: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Ryll, Wolfgang

 
9783540613046: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study: 440 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 440)
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ISBN 10: 3540613048 ISBN 13: 9783540613046
Editorial: Springer, 2013

Sinopsis

We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P’ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989 and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973. The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P’ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P’ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P’ng’s model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.

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Reseña del editor

We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989 and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973. The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.

Reseña del editor

The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "round" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.

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Editorial
Springer
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
Inglés
ISBN 10 
3540613048
ISBN 13 
9783540613046
Encuadernación
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Número de páginas
188
Contacto del fabricante
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Otras ediciones populares con el mismo título

9783642614682: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study

Edición Destacada

ISBN 10:  364261468X ISBN 13:  9783642614682
Editorial: Springer, 2011
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