This book takes three different approaches to the two-person bargaining problem with incomplete information: The game theoretic analysis, the study of the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment, and the investigation of strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects in a strategy experiment. The two different experimental approaches allow to study the bargaining behavior which emerges spontaneously in interactive plays of two subjects, and moreover the instructions experienced subjects give to a representative. The three approaches together provide a vivid picture of theoretical and experimentally observed behavior in the two-person bargaining problem. The synopsis of these different approaches is a novelty in the analysis of boundedly rational behavior.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O
This book takes three different approaches to the two-person bargaining problem with incomplete information: The game theoretic analysis, the study of the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment, and the investigation of strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects in a strategy experiment. The two different experimental approaches allow to study the bargaining behavior which emerges spontaneously in interactive plays of two subjects, and moreover the instructions experienced subjects give to a representative. The three approaches together provide a vivid picture of theoretical and experimentally observed behavior in the two-person bargaining problem. The synopsis of these different approaches is a novelty in the analysis of boundedly rational behavior.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Librería: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Reino Unido
Condición: Fair. Volume 412. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. Clean from markings. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,500grams, ISBN:3540579206. Nº de ref. del artículo: 7060848
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Librería: Antiquariat Bookfarm, Löbnitz, Alemania
Softcover. 293 S. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. L07632 3540579206 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 460. Nº de ref. del artículo: 2531052
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Librería: NEPO UG, Rüsselsheim am Main, Alemania
kart. Condición: Gut. IX, 293 S. : graph. Darst. , 24 cm Versand SOFORT weltweit. Rechnung mit ausgewiesener MwSt. auf Ihren Namen oder Ihre Firma liegt bei. Worldwide shipping with invoice. Bibliotheksexemplar., Literaturverz. S. 289 - 293 Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 550. Nº de ref. del artículo: 170904
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Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
Condición: New. In. Nº de ref. del artículo: ria9783540579205_new
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Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O 312 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783540579205
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Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. pp. 312. Nº de ref. del artículo: 2648028729
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Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 312 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam. Nº de ref. del artículo: 44786662
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Librería: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Alemania
Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 312. Nº de ref. del artículo: 1848028723
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Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 302 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.71 inches. In Stock. Nº de ref. del artículo: x-3540579206
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Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms . Nº de ref. del artículo: 4894501
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