Artículos relacionados a Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear...
Sinopsis
Book by Blair Bruce G
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Reseña del editor
During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.
Contraportada
During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
- EditorialBrookings Institution Press
- Año de publicación1985
- ISBN 10 0815709811
- ISBN 13 9780815709817
- EncuadernaciónTapa blanda
- IdiomaInglés
- Número de páginas355
Comprar nuevo
Ver este artículo
EUR 25,37
EUR 5,91 gastos de envío desde Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío
Resultados de la búsqueda para Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear...
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control
Publicado por
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Antiguo o usado
Tapa blanda
Librería: Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Condición: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp. Nº de ref. del artículo: M10D-01265
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control
Publicado por
Globe Pequot Publishing Group Inc/Bloomsbury, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Antiguo o usado
Paperback
Librería: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.14. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0815709811I3N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control
Publicado por
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Nuevo
PAP
Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido
Calificación del vendedor: 4 de 5 estrellas
PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. del artículo: CW-9780815709817
Gastos de envío:
EUR 5,91
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío
Cantidad disponible: 15 disponibles
Imagen del vendedor
Strategic Command and Control (Paperback or Softback)
Publicado por
Brookings Institution Press 5/1/1985, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Nuevo
Paperback or Softback
Librería: BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Paperback or Softback. Condición: New. Strategic Command and Control 1.1. Book. Nº de ref. del artículo: BBS-9780815709817
Cantidad disponible: 5 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Publicado por
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Antiguo o usado
Trade paperback
Original o primera edición
Librería: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Trade paperback. Condición: Very good. xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board, a small group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research, work and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. There are several definitions of command and control (C2). According to older versions of U.S. Army FM 3-0, C2 in a military organization is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The term may also refer to command and control systems within a military system. Strategic Command and Control applies to nuclear weapons. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated]. Nº de ref. del artículo: 71926
Cantidad disponible: 3 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control (Paperback)
Publicado por
Rowman & Littlefield, Washington DC, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Nuevo
Paperback
Librería: Grand Eagle Retail, Fairfield, OH, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780815709817
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Imagen del vendedor
Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Publicado por
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Antiguo o usado
Soft cover
Original o primera edición
Librería: Palimpsest Scholarly Books & Services, Brooktondale, NY, Estados Unidos de America
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Soft cover. Condición: Fine. 1st Edition. Second printing. Softcover volume, measuring approximately 6.25" x 9.25", displays very light shelfwear. Binding is firm. Interior is clean and bright. Illustrated with tables, graphs and maps. xiv/341 pages. "During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U. S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communication not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike.". Nº de ref. del artículo: ABE-1612589900598
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control
Publicado por
Brookings Institution Press, 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Nuevo
Tapa blanda
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Condición: New. In. Nº de ref. del artículo: ria9780815709817_new
Gastos de envío:
EUR 14,09
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control
Librería: Russell Books, Victoria, BC, Canada
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Softcover. Condición: New. Special order direct from the distributor. Nº de ref. del artículo: ING9780815709817
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Imagen de archivo
Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Publicado por
Brookings Institution,U.S., 1985
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Nuevo
Paperback
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas
Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 356 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock. Nº de ref. del artículo: x-0815709811
Gastos de envío:
EUR 11,76
De Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de America
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envío
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles