The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) - Tapa blanda

Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.

 
9780262529242: The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)
Tapa blanda
ISBN 10: 0262529246 ISBN 13: 9780262529242
Editorial: MIT Press, 1998

Sinopsis

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.

In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

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Acerca del autor

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

David K. Levine is John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics at Washington University, St. Louis.

"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.

Editorial
MIT Press
Año de publicación
1998
Idioma
Inglés
ISBN 10 
0262529246
ISBN 13 
9780262529242
Encuadernación
Tapa blanda
Número de páginas
293
Contacto del fabricante
no disponible
Persona responsable
no disponible

Otras ediciones populares con el mismo título

9780262061940: The Theory of Learning in Games (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

Edición Destacada

ISBN 10:  0262061945 ISBN 13:  9780262061940
Editorial: MIT Press, 1998
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