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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity | Juliane Krämer | Taschenbuch | xxi | Englisch | 2016 | Springer Singapore | EAN 9789811012990 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
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Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer Nature Singapore, 2016
ISBN 10: 9811012997 ISBN 13: 9789811012990
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in practice, they have generally not been considered a serious threat. In short, their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, the book introduces the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its initial implementation, it has not been taken seriously. The work shows both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, it presents a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either.Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone, and as such cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, whether they have already been successfully implemented or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is sufficiently understood.
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Publicado por SPRINGER NATURE Okt 2016, 2016
ISBN 10: 9811012997 ISBN 13: 9789811012990
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in practice, they have generally not been considered a serious threat. In short, their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, the book introduces the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its initial implementation, it has not been taken seriously. The work shows both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, it presents a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either.Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone, and as such cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, whether they have already been successfully implemented or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is sufficiently understood. 122 pp. Englisch.
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Presents two practical physical attacks, the complexity of which has been overestimated and the implied security threats of which have been underestimatedDemonstrates that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone and cryp.
Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Print on Demand pp. 144.
Librería: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 144.