Isbn: 9781334431760 - strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers (classic reprint) (3 resultados)

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Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaPBShop.store US
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EUR 25,41
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PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino UnidoPBShop.store UK
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EUR 24,69
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PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
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Librería: Forgotten Books, London, Reino UnidoForgotten Books
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Paperback. Condición: New. Print on Demand. This book explores strategic trade policy â" governmental intervention designed to favor domestic firms in international markets. It does so by modeling the effects of incomplete information and its impact on the government's ability to enact policy effectively. Critically, the author notes that, while there are many who warn of the difficulty of enacting strategic trade policy effectively, there is limited research on how exactly this is undermined and how policy can be modified. The book insists that government objectives diverge from those of private firms and that this is especially true in the context of international trade. The author utilizes regulation theory to explore governmental and firm relationships in trade policy and reveals the ways in which these relationships differ from those in other policy contexts. They then proceed to analyze a situation where the government must address informational asymmetries between itself and the firms that it seeks to favor. They argue that, without perfect information, the government must alter the optimal policy to manage the rent-seeking behavior of these firms and that this has a negative impact on the effectiveness of strategic trade policy generally. The author explores how this effect is magnified or reduced under different conditions, such as unilateral or bilateral intervention or under different participation constraints. This book is a crucial resource for those interested in international trade and policy. It offers new and nuanced insights into how governments can seek to favor domestic firms in international markets and will be of interest to economists, policymakers, and business leaders alike. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item.…