9780521865050 - Patrons, Clients and Policies Hardback: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition de Kitschelt; Wilkinson (13 resultados)

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries. Editor(s): Kitschelt, Herbert; Wilkinson, Steven I. Num Pages: 392 pages, 34 tables. BIC Classification: JPL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 176 x 31. Weight in Grams: 768. . 2007. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies.

Condición: New. A study of patronage politics and the persistence of clientelism across a range of countries. Editor(s): Kitschelt, Herbert; Wilkinson, Steven I. Num Pages: 392 pages, 34 tables. BIC Classification: JPL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 176 x 31. Weight in Grams: 768. . 2007. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . .

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 377 pages. 9.00x6.00x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 392.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies. Political scientists have tended to assume that 'patron-client politics' is confined to developing countries. This volume examines how, despite a wave of democratization, patronage politics continues to exist in stable and wealthy polities and offers explanations of why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 392 9:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 392.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Most models of party competition assume that citizens vote for a platform rather than narrowly targeted material benefits. However, there are many countries where politicians win elections by giving money, jobs, and services in direct exchange for votes. This is not just true in the developing world, but also in economically developed countries - such as Japan and Austria - that clearly meet the definition of stable, modern democracies. This book offers explanations for why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. Using newly collected data on national and sub-national patterns of patronage and electoral competition, the contributors demonstrate why explanations based on economic modernization or electoral institutions cannot account for international variation in patron-client and programmatic competition. Instead, they show how the interaction of economic development, party competition, governance of the economy, and ethnic heterogeneity may work together to determine the choices of patrons, clients and policies. Political scientists have tended to assume that 'patron-client politics' is confined to developing countries. This volume examines how, despite a wave of democratization, patronage politics continues to exist in stable and wealthy polities and offers explanations of why politicians engage in clientelistic behaviours and why voters respond. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Political scientists have tended to assume that patron-client politics is confined to developing countries. This volume examines how, despite a wave of democratization, patronage politics continues to exist in stable and wealthy polities and offers explan.