9780521791670 - Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia Hardback (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) de Ross (20 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: As New. This book is like new; no remainder marks. Appears to have been gently read once. Inside pages are clean.

Condición: New. pp. xvi + 237, Map.

Condición: New. pp. xvi + 237 Illus., Map.

Condición: New. pp. xvi + 237 14 Diagrams.

Condición: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Condición: Brand New. New. US edition. Expediting shipping for all USA and Europe orders excluding PO Box. Excellent Customer Service.

hardcover. Condición: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

Hardcover. Condición: New.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New. This book explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 256 pages, 14 b/w illus. 1 map 26 tables. BIC Classification: 1F; GTB; KCP; RNT. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 16. Weight in Grams: 495. . 2001. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . .

Condición: New.

Condición: New. This book explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Num Pages: 256 pages, 14 b/w illus. 1 map 26 tables. BIC Classification: 1F; GTB; KCP; RNT. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 16. Weight in Grams: 495. . 2001. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardcover. Condición: New. Brand New ! Fast Delivery "International Edition " and ship within 24-48 hours. Deliver by FedEx and Dhl, & Aramex, UPS, & USPS and we do accept APO and PO BOX Addresses. Order can be delivered worldwide within 4-6 Working days .and we do have flat rate for up to 2LB. Extra shipping charges will be requested This Item May be shipped from India, United states & United Kingdom. Depending on your location and availability.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 249 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process. Explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 249 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process. Explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states, using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. These institutions often succumb to rent-seizing - the predatory.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process. Explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.