9780275957049 - Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO -- Then and Now de Cogan, Charles (23 resultados)

Condición: As New. As New. Hardcover book in NEW condition, no dust jacket as issued.

Condición: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. Clean from markings In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,550grams, ISBN:0275957047.

Hardcover. Condición: As New. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Fine. 1st Edition. First edition stated 1997, first printing, number line starts with 1. Hardcover in full cloth with DJ. Condition new, square tight and cisp book, no edgewear, no names no underlinings no highlights no bent page corners, Not a reminder. DJ new, bright and shiny, no teas no chips no edgewear, Not clipped. 8vo, 158 pages, bibliography, index.

Condición: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Condición: Brand New. New. US edition. Expediting shipping for all USA and Europe orders excluding PO Box. Excellent Customer Service.

Condición: Fine. Unused, some outer pages have light marks from shelf wear, book content is in like new condition.

Condición: Used. pp. 176.

Condición: Used. pp. 176.

Condición: New. pp. 176 Epilogue.

hardcover. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title!

Condición: New. Satisfaction Guaranteed or your money back.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defence policy. It looks at the way in which France lost its sovereignty after World War II by joining the US camp, and the relationship of France with NATO. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: 1D; 1KBB; HBJD; HBJK; HBLW3; JPSN1; JWK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 18. Weight in Grams: 458. . 1997. Hardback. . . . .

Condición: New. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defence policy. It looks at the way in which France lost its sovereignty after World War II by joining the US camp, and the relationship of France with NATO. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: 1D; 1KBB; HBJD; HBJK; HBLW3; JPSN1; JWK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 18. Weight in Grams: 458. . 1997. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 176 pages. 9.75x6.50x0.75 inches. In Stock.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Cogan examines the France-NATO problem, going back to its origins in 1945-1952, when a weak France, obsessed by the threat of Germany and jealous of the ascendancy gained by the British during the war, sought security guarantees and assistance from the United States. However, in the process, France put itself in a position of dependence under the NATO integrated command to a degree that later governments of a resurgent France felt compelled to challengeand are still doing so today.Post-World War II France was to disappoint the hopes of such American statesmen as Dean Acheson and George Kennan, who looked to it to take the lead in Western Europe in the face of a growing Soviet threat. Dogged by the humiliation of the wartime occupation, obsessed by fear of a resurgent Germany, jealous of the British ascendancy gained during the war, and dominated by an intellectual class almost wholly given over to the prevailing antifascism (and, therefore, philo-sovietism) of the postwar, France would take 20 years to live up to its promise as the motor of Western Europe. Though it was perhaps inevitable that France, falling on the western divide of the Iron Curtain, would join the U.S. camp, it did so with a loss of sovereignty, symbolized in NATO's integrated command. This was a situation which Charles de Gaulle, after his return to power in 1958, would seek to undo. His successors have continued this quest to this day.Cogan explores the Gaullist argument that the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO are two distinct movements against a background of ever-increasing threatsor perceived threatsby the Soviet Union, culminating in the North Korean invasion of 1950. The French, desperate to emerge from a position of wartime inferiority, willingly abandoned hopes of building a defense of Europe by Europeans alone. France threw itself into the arms of the United States, partly to escape the onerous tutelage of Great Britain. In 1951, when the NATO integrated command was put in place, the French wound up with very littlenot even a major subordinate command. Frustration and, ultimately, withdrawal from the NATO military structure were the results. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defense policy for scholars and researchers alike. An examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defense policy for scholars and researchers alike. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Cogan examines the France-NATO problem, going back to its origins in 1945-1952, when a weak France, obsessed by the threat of Germany and jealous of the ascendancy gained by the British during the war, sought security guarantees and assistance from the United States. However, in the process, France put itself in a position of dependence under the NATO integrated command to a degree that later governments of a resurgent France felt compelled to challengeand are still doing so today.Post-World War II France was to disappoint the hopes of such American statesmen as Dean Acheson and George Kennan, who looked to it to take the lead in Western Europe in the face of a growing Soviet threat. Dogged by the humiliation of the wartime occupation, obsessed by fear of a resurgent Germany, jealous of the British ascendancy gained during the war, and dominated by an intellectual class almost wholly given over to the prevailing antifascism (and, therefore, philo-sovietism) of the postwar, France would take 20 years to live up to its promise as the motor of Western Europe. Though it was perhaps inevitable that France, falling on the western divide of the Iron Curtain, would join the U.S. camp, it did so with a loss of sovereignty, symbolized in NATO's integrated command. This was a situation which Charles de Gaulle, after his return to power in 1958, would seek to undo. His successors have continued this quest to this day.Cogan explores the Gaullist argument that the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO are two distinct movements against a background of ever-increasing threatsor perceived threatsby the Soviet Union, culminating in the North Korean invasion of 1950. The French, desperate to emerge from a position of wartime inferiority, willingly abandoned hopes of building a defense of Europe by Europeans alone. France threw itself into the arms of the United States, partly to escape the onerous tutelage of Great Britain. In 1951, when the NATO integrated command was put in place, the French wound up with very littlenot even a major subordinate command. Frustration and, ultimately, withdrawal from the NATO military structure were the results. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defense policy for scholars and researchers alike. An examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defense policy for scholars and researchers alike. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defence policy. It looks at the way in which France lost its sovereignty after World War II by joining the US camp, and the relationship of France with NATO.&Uu.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Forced to Choose | France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO -- Then and Now | Charles Cogan | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 1997 | Praeger | EAN 9780275957049 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Cogan examines the France-NATO problem, going back to its origins in 1945-1952, when a weak France, obsessed by the threat of Germany and jealous of the ascendancy gained by the British during the war, sought security guarantees and assistance from the United States. However, in the process, France put itself in a position of dependence under the NATO integrated command to a degree that later governments of a resurgent France felt compelled to challenge-and are still doing so today.Post-World War II France was to disappoint the hopes of such American statesmen as Dean Acheson and George Kennan, who looked to it to take the lead in Western Europe in the face of a growing Soviet threat. Dogged by the humiliation of the wartime occupation, obsessed by fear of a resurgent Germany, jealous of the British ascendancy gained during the war, and dominated by an intellectual class almost wholly given over to the prevailing antifascism (and, therefore, philo-sovietism) of the postwar, France would take 20 years to live up to its promise as the motor of Western Europe. Though it was perhaps inevitable that France, falling on the western divide of the Iron Curtain, would join the U.S. camp, it did so with a loss of sovereignty, symbolized in NATO's integrated command. This was a situation which Charles de Gaulle, after his return to power in 1958, would seek to undo. His successors have continued this quest to this day.Cogan explores the Gaullist argument that the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO are two distinct movements against a background of ever-increasing threats-or perceived threats-by the Soviet Union, culminating in the North Korean invasion of 1950. The French, desperate to emerge from a position of wartime inferiority, willingly abandoned hopes of building a defense of Europe by Europeans alone. France threw itself into the arms of the United States, partly to escape the onerous tutelage of Great Britain. In 1951, when the NATO integrated command was put in place, the French wound up with very little-not even a major subordinate command. Frustration and, ultimately, withdrawal from the NATO military structure were the results. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defense policy for scholars and researchers alike.