9780275941017 - Future of Biological Weapons (The Washington Papers) de Ter Haar, Barend J.; Ter Haar, Barend (16 resultados)

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. The know-how and materials required to produce biological warfare agents are the same as those required for medical and veterinary products; biological warfare technology is quickly spreading across the globe. In this new study, Barend ter Haar argues that a policy of nonproliferation might slow down the current trend toward worldwide deployment of biological weapons, but it is ultimately doomed without a strengthened ban on them.Ter Haar discusses the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which did not categorically prohibit activities leading to biological weapons and failed to provide confidence-building measures and allegation procedures. He evaluates the confidence measures added in the 1986 Second Review Conference, and demonstrates how they were neglected by some countries. Ter Haar concludes that the Convention measures are almost unverifiable and proposes a stronger, universal ban that includes improved procedures, regular consultative meetings, extended information exchange restrictions, routine verification, challenge inspections, and other measures. This study is an important resource for professionals, students, and scholars of diplomacy, disarmament, international relations, and the protection of the environment. Based on a discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, this book argues that a policy of nonproliferation might slow down the current trend towards worldwide deployment of biological weapons, but is ultimately doomed without a strengthened ban on them. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. The know-how and materials required to produce biological warfare agents are the same as those required for medical and veterinary products; biological warfare technology is quickly spreading across the globe. In this new study, Barend ter Haar argues that a policy of nonproliferation might slow down the current trend toward worldwide deployment of biological weapons, but it is ultimately doomed without a strengthened ban on them.Ter Haar discusses the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which did not categorically prohibit activities leading to biological weapons and failed to provide confidence-building measures and allegation procedures. He evaluates the confidence measures added in the 1986 Second Review Conference, and demonstrates how they were neglected by some countries. Ter Haar concludes that the Convention measures are almost unverifiable and proposes a stronger, universal ban that includes improved procedures, regular consultative meetings, extended information exchange restrictions, routine verification, challenge inspections, and other measures. This study is an important resource for professionals, students, and scholars of diplomacy, disarmament, international relations, and the protection of the environment. Based on a discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, this book argues that a policy of nonproliferation might slow down the current trend towards worldwide deployment of biological weapons, but is ultimately doomed without a strengthened ban on them. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Based on a discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, this book argues that a policy of nonproliferation might slow down the current trend towards worldwide deployment of biological weapons, but is ultimately doomed without a strengthened ban .

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - The know-how and materials required to produce biological warfare agents are the same as those required for medical and veterinary products; biological warfare technology is quickly spreading across the globe. In this new study, Barend ter Haar argues that a policy of nonproliferation might slow down the current trend toward worldwide deployment of biological weapons, but it is ultimately doomed without a strengthened ban on them.Ter Haar discusses the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which did not categorically prohibit activities leading to biological weapons and failed to provide confidence-building measures and allegation procedures. He evaluates the confidence measures added in the 1986 Second Review Conference, and demonstrates how they were neglected by some countries. Ter Haar concludes that the Convention measures are almost unverifiable and proposes a stronger, universal ban that includes improved procedures, regular consultative meetings, extended information exchange restrictions, routine verification, challenge inspections, and other measures. This study is an important resource for professionals, students, and scholars of diplomacy, disarmament, international relations, and the protection of the environment.