9780199267750 - Private Sector Involvement and International Financial Crises: An Analytical Perspective de Chui, Michael; Gai, Prasanna (20 resultados)

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Condición: New. Offering an analytical perspective on the design of the international financial architecture, this book aims to set out a framework for the assessment of crisis management policy. The issues examined include the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, and the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries. Num Pages: 224 pages, numerous line figures. BIC Classification: KCLF; KCX; KFFH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 163 x 17. Weight in Grams: 485. . 2005. Hardback. . . . .

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Offering an analytical perspective on the design and reform of the international financial architecture, this book stresses the important role played by creditor co-ordination problems in the origin and management of crises by relating the insights of the new literature on global games to earlier work on currency crises, bank runs, and sovereign debt default. It examines the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, the role of the IMF in influencing creditors anddebtor countries, and the currency composition of sovereign debt, and draws on recent research and policy work.The book's first part provides a critical synthesis of theliterature underpinning the architecture debate. It reviews the traditional distinction between "fundamentals-based" and "sunspot-based" crises before reconciling the two using global game methods. The role of co-ordination problems in sparking costly liquidation and influencing the debtor's incentives to repay is then examined in depth and shown to lie at the heart of crisis management policy. The empirical literature on leading indicators of crisis is also critically examined and related tothe architecture debate.In its second part the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against theinefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate affair warranting a cautious approach by would-bearchitects. Offering an analytical perspective on the design of the international financial architecture, this book aims to set out a framework for the assessment of crisis management policy. The issues examined include the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, and the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Offering an analytical perspective on the design of the international financial architecture, this book aims to set out a framework for the assessment of crisis management policy. The issues examined include the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, and the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries. Num Pages: 224 pages, numerous line figures. BIC Classification: KCLF; KCX; KFFH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 163 x 17. Weight in Grams: 485. . 2005. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Offering an analytical perspective on the design and reform of the international financial architecture, this book stresses the important role played by creditor co-ordination problems in the origin and management of crises by relating the insights of the new literature on global games to earlier work on currency crises, bank runs, and sovereign debt default. It examines the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, the role of the IMF in influencing creditors anddebtor countries, and the currency composition of sovereign debt, and draws on recent research and policy work.The book's first part provides a critical synthesis of theliterature underpinning the architecture debate. It reviews the traditional distinction between "fundamentals-based" and "sunspot-based" crises before reconciling the two using global game methods. The role of co-ordination problems in sparking costly liquidation and influencing the debtor's incentives to repay is then examined in depth and shown to lie at the heart of crisis management policy. The empirical literature on leading indicators of crisis is also critically examined and related tothe architecture debate.In its second part the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against theinefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate affair warranting a cautious approach by would-bearchitects. Offering an analytical perspective on the design of the international financial architecture, this book aims to set out a framework for the assessment of crisis management policy. The issues examined include the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, and the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Offering an analytical perspective on the design and reform of the international financial architecture, this book stresses the important role played by creditor co-ordination problems in the origin and management of crises by relating the insights of the new literature on global games to earlier work on currency crises, bank runs, and sovereign debt default. It examines the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, the role of the IMF in influencing creditors anddebtor countries, and the currency composition of sovereign debt, and draws on recent research and policy work.The book's first part provides a critical synthesis of theliterature underpinning the architecture debate. It reviews the traditional distinction between "fundamentals-based" and "sunspot-based" crises before reconciling the two using global game methods. The role of co-ordination problems in sparking costly liquidation and influencing the debtor's incentives to repay is then examined in depth and shown to lie at the heart of crisis management policy. The empirical literature on leading indicators of crisis is also critically examined and related tothe architecture debate.In its second part the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against theinefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate affair warranting a cautious approach by would-bearchitects. Offering an analytical perspective on the design of the international financial architecture, this book aims to set out a framework for the assessment of crisis management policy. The issues examined include the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, and the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Offering an analytical perspective on the design and reform of the international financial architecture, this book stresses the important role played by creditor co-ordination problems in the origin and management of crises by relating the insights of the new literature on global games to earlier work on currency crises, bank runs, and sovereign debt default. It examines the design of sovereign bankruptcy procedures, the role of the IMF in influencing creditors and debtor countries, and the currency composition of sovereign debt, and draws on recent research and policy work.The book's first part provides a critical synthesis of the literature underpinning the architecture debate. It reviews the traditional distinction between 'fundamentals-based' and 'sunspot-based' crises before reconciling the two using global game methods. The role of co-ordination problems in sparking costly liquidation and influencing the debtor's incentives to repay is then examined in depth and shown to lie at the heart of crisis management policy. The empirical literature on leading indicators of crisis is also critically examined and related to the architecture debate.In its second part the book examines key issues in crisis management. Suggesting that optimal reforms must set the inefficiencies of crisis against the inefficiencies of debtor moral hazard, the authors consider the relative merits of statutory and contractual solutions to sovereign debt workouts. They go on to discuss the role of the IMF in influencing private lending and debtor moral hazard, theoretically and empirically. They argue that there is no simple relationship between ex post crisis management and ex ante moral hazard, implying that the handling of financial crises is a delicate affair warranting a cautious approach by would-be architects.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Private Sector Involvement and International Financial Crises | An Analytical Perspective | Michael Chui (u. a.) | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2005 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199267750 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.