9780199244355 - Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience de McKay, David (23 resultados)

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Condición: New. McKay examines the likely policy dynamics of the European Union following the adoption of a single currency in 1999. The volume studies the experience of existing federations with the specific purpose of identifying those arrangements that hold lessons for the emerging European polity. Num Pages: 178 pages, numerous tables. BIC Classification: 1QFE; JPA; JPSN2; KCP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 15. Weight in Grams: 306. . 2001. Paperback. . . . .

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Condición: New. McKay examines the likely policy dynamics of the European Union following the adoption of a single currency in 1999. The volume studies the experience of existing federations with the specific purpose of identifying those arrangements that hold lessons for the emerging European polity. Num Pages: 178 pages, numerous tables. BIC Classification: 1QFE; JPA; JPSN2; KCP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 15. Weight in Grams: 306. . 2001. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Few dispute that one of the most pressing issues for the future of the Europe is the question of constitutional design. To what extent will unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers replaced by qualified majority voting and how should these votes be distributed by country? Should the European Parliament assume a meaningful policy making role? How should the Commission be reformed? Generally this debate uses the existing and past experience of the European Unionas a basis for future reform. Comparisons with other political systems and in particular with those systems that devolve power to states, provinces and regions are rarely attempted. Yet with EMU inplace and further deepening of EU responsibilities scheduled, much can be learnt from the experience of other systems and especially established federations. Designing Europe shows how in five cases - the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland - the rules established in founding constitutions greatly influenced the ways in which federal-state relations evolved. In some cases, for example Canada, these rules proved inappropriate for the balance of provincial and central power, while inothers, such as Switzerland, more favourable institutional rules prevailed. In all cases political parties have played a major role in brokering this balance of central and regional power. And in allcases intergovernmental fiscal relations have been central to the debate.Designing Europe concludes that because, like Switzerland, the EU is both highly decentralised and heterogeneous, super-majoritarian decision rules should apply to EU decision making. In addition further checks on central power should be provided through a carefully coded constitution amendments to which could only be amended via popular approval in member states. McKay examines the likely policy dynamics of the European Union following the adoption of a single currency in 1999. The volume studies the experience of existing federations with the specific purpose of identifying those arrangements that hold lessons for the emerging European polity. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 180 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Few dispute that one of the most pressing issues for the future of the Europe is the question of constitutional design. To what extent will unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers replaced by qualified majority voting and how should these votes be distributed by country? Should the European Parliament assume a meaningful policy making role? How should the Commission be reformed? Generally this debate uses the existing and past experience of the European Unionas a basis for future reform. Comparisons with other political systems and in particular with those systems that devolve power to states, provinces and regions are rarely attempted. Yet with EMU inplace and further deepening of EU responsibilities scheduled, much can be learnt from the experience of other systems and especially established federations. Designing Europe shows how in five cases - the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland - the rules established in founding constitutions greatly influenced the ways in which federal-state relations evolved. In some cases, for example Canada, these rules proved inappropriate for the balance of provincial and central power, while inothers, such as Switzerland, more favourable institutional rules prevailed. In all cases political parties have played a major role in brokering this balance of central and regional power. And in allcases intergovernmental fiscal relations have been central to the debate.Designing Europe concludes that because, like Switzerland, the EU is both highly decentralised and heterogeneous, super-majoritarian decision rules should apply to EU decision making. In addition further checks on central power should be provided through a carefully coded constitution amendments to which could only be amended via popular approval in member states. McKay examines the likely policy dynamics of the European Union following the adoption of a single currency in 1999. The volume studies the experience of existing federations with the specific purpose of identifying those arrangements that hold lessons for the emerging European polity. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 180.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. McKay examines the likely policy dynamics of the European Union following the adoption of a single currency in 1999. The volume studies the experience of existing federations with the specific purpose of identifying those arrangements that hold lessons for .

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Few dispute that one of the most pressing issues for the future of the Europe is the question of constitutional design. To what extent will unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers replaced by qualified majority voting and how should these votes be distributed by country? Should the European Parliament assume a meaningful policy making role? How should the Commission be reformed? Generally this debate uses the existing and past experience of the European Unionas a basis for future reform. Comparisons with other political systems and in particular with those systems that devolve power to states, provinces and regions are rarely attempted. Yet with EMU inplace and further deepening of EU responsibilities scheduled, much can be learnt from the experience of other systems and especially established federations. Designing Europe shows how in five cases - the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland - the rules established in founding constitutions greatly influenced the ways in which federal-state relations evolved. In some cases, for example Canada, these rules proved inappropriate for the balance of provincial and central power, while inothers, such as Switzerland, more favourable institutional rules prevailed. In all cases political parties have played a major role in brokering this balance of central and regional power. And in allcases intergovernmental fiscal relations have been central to the debate.Designing Europe concludes that because, like Switzerland, the EU is both highly decentralised and heterogeneous, super-majoritarian decision rules should apply to EU decision making. In addition further checks on central power should be provided through a carefully coded constitution amendments to which could only be amended via popular approval in member states. McKay examines the likely policy dynamics of the European Union following the adoption of a single currency in 1999. The volume studies the experience of existing federations with the specific purpose of identifying those arrangements that hold lessons for the emerging European polity. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Designing Europe | Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience | David McKay | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2001 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199244355 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Few dispute that one of the most pressing issues for the future of the Europe is the question of constitutional design. To what extent will unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers replaced by qualified majority voting and how should these votes be distributed by country Should the European Parliament assume a meaningful policy making role How should the Commission be reformed Generally this debate uses the existing and past experience of the European Union as a basis for future reform. Comparisons with other political systems and in particular with those systems that devolve power to states, provinces and regions are rarely attempted. Yet with EMU in place and further deepening of EU responsibilities scheduled, much can be learnt from the experience of other systems and especially established federations. Designing Europe shows how in five cases - the US, Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland - the rules established in founding constitutions greatly influenced the ways in which federal-state relations evolved. In some cases, for example Canada, these rules proved inappropriate for the balance of provincial and central power, while in others, such as Switzerland, more favourable institutional rules prevailed. In all cases political parties have played a major role in brokering this balance of central and regional power. And in all cases intergovernmental fiscal relations have been central to the debate.Designing Europe concludes that because, like Switzerland, the EU is both highly decentralised and heterogeneous, super-majoritarian decision rules should apply to EU decision making. In addition further checks on central power should be provided through a carefully coded constitution amendments to which could only be amended via popular approval in member states.