wit joel poneman daniel (24 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Former library book; Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Condición: very_good. Gently read. May have name of previous ownership, or ex-library edition. Binding tight; spine straight and smooth, with no creasing; covers clean and crisp. Minimal signs of handling or shelving. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item for full refund. Ships USPS Media Mail.

Condición: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Condición: very_good.

Tapa Blanda. Condición: Buen estado.

Paperback. Condición: Very Good-. Advance Review Copy; No Printing Stated. 441 pages; minor shelf wear on cover edges. A couple of minor finger rubbing smudges on the exterior edges of textblock. Very Good condition otherwise. No other noteworthy defects. No markings. ; - Your satisfaction is our priority. We offer free returns and respond promptly to all inquiries. Your item will be packaged with care and ship on the same or next business day. Buy with confidence.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condición: Very good. Estado de la sobrecubierta: very good. First Printing [Stated]. xviii, [2], 474, [2] pages. DJ has slight wear and soiling. Minor edge soiling. Illustrations. Chronology. Notes. Index. In Going Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze-and pledge ultimately to dismantle-its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy-from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again-that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. The story of the 1994 confrontation provides important lessons for the United States as it grapples once again with a nuclear crisis on a peninsula that half a century ago claimed more than 50,000 American lives and today bristles with arms along the De-Militarized Zone separating the two Koreas. Joel S. Wit is concurrently a Senior Fellow at the US-Korea Institute at SAIS and a Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University Weatherhead Institute for East Asian Studies.He has served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert L. Galluci from 1993-1995, where he developed strategies to help resolve the crisis over North Korea's weapons program, and as Coordinator for the US-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1995-1999, where he was the official in charge of implementation. He was also a key participant in the establishment of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO).Prior to his efforts on the Agreed Framework, Wit was assigned to the State Department's Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on a range of issues related to nuclear arms control and weapons proliferation. In that capacity from 1988 to 1992, Wit helped negotiate strategic arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union and participated in the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle its nuclear weapons.In addition, he has published numerous articles on Northeast Asian security issues. He has also written numerous articles on North Korea and nonproliferation and is the coauthor of the book Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).Daniel Bruce Poneman (born March 12, 1956) is an American politician who was the United States Deputy Secretary of Energy from 2009 to 2014 and is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago. Poneman was briefly Acting Secretary of Energy in 2013 following the resignation of Steven Chu until Ernest Moniz was confirmed and sworn in. Daniel B. Poneman was nominated by President Barack Obama to be United States Deputy Secretary of Energy on April 20, 2009, and was confirmed by the United States Senate on May 18, 2009. He also served as Chief Operating Officer of the Department of Energy. Poneman served as Acting Secretary of Energy following the resignation of Secretary Chu on April 22, 2013 until his successor, Ernest Moniz was confirmed by the Senate and was sworn in on May 21, 2013. Poneman was a principal of The Scowcroft Group, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C., in the eight years prior to his appointment to the United States Department of Energy. Before his consulting role, Poneman was also a partner in the law firm of Hogan & Hartson. Between 1993 and 1996, Poneman served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National Security Council. He joined the NSC staff in 1990 as the Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control.

Paperback. Condición: New. A decade before being proclaimed part of the ""axis of evil,"" North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freezeand pledge ultimately to dismantleits dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back againthat led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio.

Hard Cover. Condición: Near Fine. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Near Fine. First Edition. 448pp In this work, three former US officials who played key roles in the 1994 crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze - and pledge to ultimately dismantle - its dangerous plutonium production programme, while avoiding a second Korean War. Clean.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condición: New. A decade before being proclaimed part of the ""axis of evil,"" North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freezeand pledge ultimately to dismantleits dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back againthat led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio.

Condición: New. pp. 474.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 474 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.25 inches. In Stock.

hardcover. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title!

Paperback. Condición: New. A decade before being proclaimed part of the ""axis of evil,"" North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freezeand pledge ultimately to dismantleits dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back againthat led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio.

Paperback. Condición: New. A decade before being proclaimed part of the ""axis of evil,"" North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections. U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries. In Go ing Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freezeand pledge ultimately to dismantleits dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back againthat led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontatio.

Hardcover. Condición: Very good. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Very good. First Printing [Stated]. xviii, [2], 474, [2] pages. DJ has slight wear and soiling. Minor edge soiling. Illustrations. Chronology. Notes. Index. Inscribed by Poneman on the fep To Vic Reis--A great public and original thinker on issues of greatest importance to us all--With respect and warm regards--Dan Poneman. Vic Reis is a technologist and former U.S. government official, best known as the architect and original sponsor of the U.S. nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program. In Going Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freezeand pledge ultimately to dismantleits plutonium production program under international inspection. Drawing on documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacyfrom Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back againthat led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. They explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. The story of the 1994 confrontation provides important lessons for the United States as it grapples once again with a nuclear crisis on a peninsula that half a century ago claimed more than 50,000 American lives and today bristles with arms along the De-Militarized Zone separating the two Koreas. Joel S. Wit has served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert L. Galluci from 1993-1995, where he developed strategies to help resolve the crisis over North Korea's weapons program, and as Coordinator for the US-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1995-1999, where he was the official in charge of implementation. He was also a key participant in the establishment of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Prior to his efforts on the Agreed Framework, Wit was assigned to the State Department's Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on a range of issues related to nuclear arms control and weapons proliferation. In that capacity from 1988 to 1992, Wit helped negotiate strategic arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union and participated in the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle its nuclear weapons. Daniel Bruce Poneman (born March 12, 1956) is an American politician who was the United States Deputy Secretary of Energy from 2009 to 2014. Poneman was a principal of The Scowcroft Group, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C., in the eight years prior to his appointment to the United States Department of Energy. Robert L. Gallucci (born February 11, 1946) is an Italian American academic and diplomat, who formerly worked as president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He previously served as dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, from 1996 to June 2009. During the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, Gallucci was the chief U.S. negotiator.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 474.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 474.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Klappentext A decade before being proclaimed part of the axis of evil, North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its dece.