Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind (Representation and Mind). Este artículo no está disponible.
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Idioma: inglés
Editorial: Mit Pr, 1995
- Tapa dura
- Usado

Vendedor patrimonial
Librería: Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaWonder Book
Vendedor de 5 estrellas
Vendedor de IberLibro desde 1 de noviembre de 1997
No disponible
Tapa dura
Condición: Usado - Aceptable
EUR 6,42
Descripción del artículo del vendedor
Good condition. Good dust jacket. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains.
N° de ref. del artículo J09P-00599
- Título
- Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind (Representation and Mind)
- Autor
- Tye, Michael
- Editorial
- Mit Pr
- Año de publicación
- 1995
- Estado
- Good
- Sobrecubierta
- Sobrecubierta Incluida
- Encuadernación
- Encuadernación de tapa dura
- Idioma
- inglés
- ISBN 10
- 0262201038
- ISBN 13
- 9780262201032
Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and grey matter comprising our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a theory about the phenomenal "what it feels like" aspect of consciousness. The test of any such theory, according to Tye, lies in how well it handles ten critical problems of consciousness. Tye argues that all experiences and all feelings represent things, and that their phenomenal aspects are to be understood in terms of what they represent. He develops this representational approach to consciousness in detail with great ingenuity and originality. In the book's first part Tye lays out the domain, the ten problems and an associated paradox, along with all the theories currently available and the difficulties they face. In part two, he develops his intentionalist approach to consciousness. Special summaries are provided in boxes and ten problems are illustrated with cartoons.
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Reseña del editor
Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and grey matter comprising our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a theory about the phenomenal "what it feels like" aspect of consciousness. The test of any such theory, according to Tye, lies in how well it handles ten critical problems of consciousness. Tye argues that all experiences and all feelings represent things, and that their phenomenal aspects are to be understood in terms of what they represent. He develops this representational approach to consciousness in detail with great ingenuity and originality. In the book's first part Tye lays out the domain, the ten problems and an associated paradox, along with all the theories currently available and the difficulties they face. In part two, he develops his intentionalist approach to consciousness. Special summaries are provided in boxes and ten problems are illustrated with cartoons.
“Acerca de” puede pertenecer a otra edición de este título.