How Shareholder Reforms Can Pay Foreign Policy Dividends: A Council on Foreign Relations Paper (Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations Press)). Este artículo no está disponible.
Idioma: inglés
Editorial: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2002
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N° de ref. del artículo WAL-C-4a-002939
- Título
- How Shareholder Reforms Can Pay Foreign Policy Dividends: A Council on Foreign Relations Paper (Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations Press))
- Autor
- Shinn, James
- Editorial
- Council on Foreign Relations Press
- Año de publicación
- 2002
- Estado
- Good
- Encuadernación
- Encuadernación de tapa blanda
- Idioma
- inglés
- ISBN 10
- 0876093136
- ISBN 13
- 9780876093139
Corporate governance must be a top US foreign policy priority, according to the authors of this analysis. Not only can good governance practices facilitate free trade by taking many disputes off the trade agenda, they can also stabilize the financial system by avoiding expensive and unpopular bailouts. To achieve these goals, however, US leaders must engage other countries in serious reform of governance systems around the world. This paper argues that US foreign policy makers must accelerate the pace of corporate governance reform. The United States should require fuller disclosure of institutional investors' corporate governance policies, encourage the convergence of differing accounting standards, expand official support for an international corporate governance standard, endorse regulatory changes that promote contests for control of publicly traded firms, and place responsibility for corporate governance policy at a senior level in Washington.
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Acerca del autor
Peter Gourevitch is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), and Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.
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