Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War. Este artículo no está disponible.Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War

The British Army is frequently criticised for not having learned the lessons of the Great War, and for ’marking time’ between the wars and failing to pursue such developments as the arrival of the tank.This concise report, then, is of uncommon historical interest in being the official findings of a high-powered committee of Generals which in October 1932 reported to the War Office on lessons learned from the 1914-18 conflict. Among the conclusions reached by the committee (which, as early as 1932, foresaw the possibility of a ’second round’ fought with Germany), - were the importance of a centrally controlled War Department which would not delegate powers to local theatres; the necessity of a rapid expansion of Britain’s small professional army; the importance of keeping abreast of scientific developments relevant to warfare; training up an officer corps rather than allowing them to be killed early as cannon fodder; and the necessity of forming a national ’non-party’ government. Brief though it is, this is an extremely interesting and important insight into military thinking among the Higher Command in the period leading up to the Second World War. Rare in its original printing just 125 sets issued .

The British Army is frequently criticised for not having learned the lessons of the Great War, and for 'marking time' between the wars and failing to pursue such developments as the arrival of the tank.This concise report, then, is of uncommon historical interest in being the official findings of a high-powered committee of Generals which in October 1932 reported to the War Office on lessons learned from the 1914-18 conflict. Among the conclusions reached by the committee (which, as early as 1932, foresaw the possibility of a 'second round' fought with Germany), - were the importance of a centrally controlled War Department which would not delegate powers to local theatres; the necessity of a rapid expansion of Britain's small professional army; the importance of keeping abreast of scientific developments relevant to warfare; training up an officer corps rather than allowing them to be killed early as cannon fodder; and the necessity of forming a national 'non-party' government. Brief though it is, this is an extremely interesting and important insight into military thinking among the Higher Command in the period leading up to the Second World War. Rare in its original printing just 125 sets issued .