Nuclear Weapons Complex: Issues Surrounding Consolidating Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories; Statement of Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division: Testimony Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, GAO/T-RCED-92-98

[1], 31 pages. Together with copies of the testimonies of John Deutch (10 pages), Lewis Branscomb (11 pages), William Brinkman (5 pages), and Eric Bloch (14 pages). Also included at the Opening Remarks of Chairman George E. Brown, Jr. (5 pages). Dr. Deutch testified in his capacity as an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and referred to his holding several positions at the Department of Energy during the period 1978 to 1980. Professor Branscomb testified in his capacity as the Director, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program as the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Professor Branscomb had served as the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President and was thus the President's Science Advisor. William F. Brinkman testified as the Executive Director, Research, Physics Division of AT&T Bell Laboratories. William Frank Brinkman was an American physicist who served as president of the American Physical Society (2002) and was the head of the Office of Science at the United States Department of Energy (2009-2013). He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1984, and won the George E. Pake Prize in 1994. Erich Bloch was a Distinguished Fellow, Council on Competitiveness. Erich Bloch (1925 - 2016) was an electrical engineer and administrator. He was involved with developing IBM's first transistorized supercomputer, 7030 Stretch, and mainframe computer, System/360. He served as director of the National Science Foundation from 1984 to 1990. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to be here today to testify on the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories. As you requested, our testimony focuses on three areas: (1) the research, development, and testing (RD&T) capabilities of the Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories; (2) the recent trends in staffing and funding at DOE's weapons laboratories; and (3) options identified by the laboratories and DOE for consolidating the Los Alamos and Livermore RD&T programs. This testimony provides a baseline for future congressional deliberations on these issue. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories maintain a deliberately redundant nuclear warhead research, development, and testing (RD&T) infrastructure. The redundancy between Los Alamos and Livermore was intended to stimulate competition in the nation's efforts to design nuclear warheads. With the end of the Cold War, however, the nature of the nuclear warhead RD&T effort at the laboratories has been changing rapidly. Changes in the world, coupled with the possibility of substantial budget cuts in the nuclear weapons area, brings into question whether the nation still needs or can financially sustain the laboratories' current level of redundancy. In summary, although Los Alamos and Livermore have duplicative RD&T capabilities in general, over the years their independent approaches have led to each developing specialized knowledge and capabilities. Over the past several years, both RD&T funding and staffing have declined significantly at the laboratories. With this recent and anticipated continued decline in resources devoted to nuclear weapons RD&T, some consolidation of the laboratories' functions has already occurred and more is in process. The laboratories believe the potential savings are small relative to the funds needed to maintain the entire nuclear weapons complex. The laboratories believe, however, that savings are possible by avoiding additional duplicative facilities in the future. Both laboratories strongly prefer the current two-laboratory structure for weapons design. However, Los Alamos officials believe that if the nation is to maintain its nuclear competence in the event of further significant cuts in nuclear weapons RD&T, the current structure may need to be radically altered. In addition, they believe that any new configuration must maintain the cu.…