The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations.. Este artículo no está disponible.
Idioma: inglés
Editorial: Cambridge University Press, 1985
- Tapa dura
- Usado

Librería: books4less (Versandantiquariat Petra Gros GmbH & Co. KG), Welling, Alemaniabooks4less (Versandantiquariat Petra Gros GmbH & Co. KG)
Vendedor de 5 estrellas
Vendedor de IberLibro desde 18 de marzo de 2011
No disponible
Tapa dura
Condición: Usado - Bueno
EUR 6,95
Descripción del artículo del vendedor
195 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 390.
N° de ref. del artículo 2288157
- Título
- The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations.
- Autor
- Breton, Albert and Ronald Wintrobe:
- Editorial
- Cambridge University Press
- Año de publicación
- 1985
- Estado
- Gut
- Encuadernación
- gebundene Ausgabe
- Idioma
- inglés
- ISBN 10
- 0521245893
- ISBN 13
- 9780521245890
- Peso del artículo
- 390 gramos
- Catálogos de vendedores
- 90 Varia
In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy.
“Sinopsis” puede pertenecer a otra edición de este título.
Reseña del editor
In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it.
“Acerca de” puede pertenecer a otra edición de este título.