Sinopsis
When examining the terms and data of our general inquiry in the opening chapter, we distinguished (8) be tween knowledge proper and mere consciousness ;between reflex consciousness and the implicit, concomitant awareness which the conscious subject necessarily has of itself in all its conscious states or activities, without which these could not be conscious, and which is usually described as direct consciousness ;between non-cognitive (volitional, emotional, etc.) and cognitive consciousness ;between the interpretative objectivity of those cognitive states of consciousness which frll short of judgment, and the formal or consciously asserted objectivity of the judgment itself. We have also been obliged, in our exposition of the doctrines of Descartes, Kant andS cholasticism (77), to discuss at some length the nature and validity of our awareness of the self as a concrete, existing, individual reality. Presupposing what has been said already in those connexions we may be brief in our present exposition of the cognitive value or significance of the facts of consciousness and memory, an exposition which will serve as a necessary and natural transition from intellectual knowledge to sense knowledge. The psychological distinction between intellectual conscious ness, whereby we are aware of our intellectual activities such as thought and volition, and sense consciousness, whereby we are aware of our external sense functions and the states and conditions of our bodies, is not itself a datum of consciousness, but an inference arising from introspection and based on the VOL. II.
(Typographical errors above are due to OCR software and don't occur in the book.)
About the Publisher
Forgotten Books is a publisher of historical writings, such as: Philosophy, Classics, Science, Religion, History, Folklore and Mythology.
Forgotten Books' Classic Reprint Series utilizes the latest technology to reg
Reseña del editor
When examining the terms and data of our general inquiry in the opening chapter, we distinguished (8) be tween knowledge proper and mere consciousness ;between reflex consciousness and the implicit, concomitant awareness which the conscious subject necessarily has of itself in all its conscious states or activities, without which these could not be conscious, and which is usually described as direct consciousness ;between non-cognitive (volitional, emotional, etc.) and cognitive consciousness ;between the interpretative objectivity of those cognitive states of consciousness which frll short of judgment, and the formal or consciously asserted objectivity of the judgment itself. We have also been obliged, in our exposition of the doctrines of Descartes, Kant andS cholasticism (77), to discuss at some length the nature and validity of our awareness of the self as a concrete, existing, individual reality. Presupposing what has been said already in those connexions we may be brief in our present exposition of the cognitive value or significance of the facts of consciousness and memory, an exposition which will serve as a necessary and natural transition from intellectual knowledge to sense knowledge. The psychological distinction between intellectual conscious ness, whereby we are aware of our intellectual activities such as thought and volition, and sense consciousness, whereby we are aware of our external sense functions and the states and conditions of our bodies, is not itself a datum of consciousness, but an inference arising from introspection and based on the VOL. II.
(Typographical errors above are due to OCR software and don't occur in the book.)
About the Publisher
Forgotten Books is a publisher of historical writings, such as: Philosophy, Classics, Science, Religion, History, Folklore and Mythology.
Forgotten Books' Classic Reprint Series utilizes the latest technology to reg
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