Democratic Institutional Design

Idioma: inglés

Editorial: Stanford University Press, US, 2000

0804735700 / 9780804735704

Librería: Rarewaves USA, HEBRON, KY, Estados Unidos de AmericaRarewaves USA

Vendedor de 5 estrellas

Vendedor de IberLibro desde 10 de junio de 2025

Tapa dura

Condición: Nuevo

EUR 135,20

 Gastos de envío gratis 
Se envía dentro de Estados Unidos de America

Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles

Añadir al carrito
Devoluciones gratuitas de 30 días

Descripción del artículo del vendedor

Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Several institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority. Because of its dominance, the Venezuelan executive branch is the focus of interest-group pressure, which is institutionalized through consultative commissions and a decentralized public administration. The author analyzes memberships of more than 300 advisory commissions and governing boards, revealing the preponderance of posts filled by umbrella agencies for business and labor. The interaction of this limited version of civil society with policy makers in the executive branch has led to a highly protectionist development strategy and excessive government subsidies. The strategy and the political process that made it possible were both exhausted by the end of the 1980s. Venezuela was in political and economic crisis. The author places Venezuela in a comparative context with other Latin American states on three issues: the likelihood that executives will receive disciplined, majority support in the legislature; the constitutional powers of presidents; and the degree to which business and labor are formally incorporated through single peak associations. Participation and policy-making processes vary significantly across Latin American democracies, with few others reaching the level of centralization that has characterized Venezuela. At the other end of the spectrum, some Latin American institutional designs are characterized by diffusion and fragmentation. In conclusion, the author offers a blueprint to modify some of the counterproductive patterns associated with Venezuela, one of the longest-lived but now troubled democracies in Latin America.…

N° de ref. del artículo LU-9780804735704

Título
Democratic Institutional Design
Autor
Brian F. Crisp
Editorial
Stanford University Press, US
Año de publicación
2000
Estado
New
Encuadernación
Hardback
Idioma
inglés
ISBN 10
0804735700
ISBN 13
9780804735704
Peso del artículo
544 gramos

Rarewaves USA

HEBRON, KY, Estados Unidos de America

Vendedor de 5 estrellas

Vendedor de IberLibro desde 10 de junio de 2025

Tarifas de envío en Estados Unidos de America

ArtículoDe 10 a 13 días hábilesDe 10 a 13 días hábiles
Primer artículoEUR 0,00EUR 0,00
Los plazos de entrega los establecen los vendedores y varían según el transportista y la ubicación. Los pedidos que pasan por la aduana pueden sufrir retrasos y los compradores son responsables de los aranceles o tarifas asociadas. Los vendedores pueden ponerse en contacto con usted en relación con cargos adicionales para cubrir cualquier aumento en los costes de envío de los artículos.

Métodos de pago

  • Visa
  • Mastercard
  • American Express
  • Carte Bleue
  • Apple Pay
  • Google Pay

Información empresarial del vendedor

Rarewaves USA

10100 West Sample Road, Ste 101
Coral Springs, FL Estados Unidos de America 33065