Congress's Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers. Este artículo no está disponible.
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Idioma: inglés
Editorial: Yale University Press, 2019
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Librería: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaWorld of Books (was SecondSale)
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Item in good condition. Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
N° de ref. del artículo 00106452289
- Título
- Congress's Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers
- Autor
- Chafetz, Josh
- Editorial
- Yale University Press
- Año de publicación
- 2019
- Estado
- Good
- Encuadernación
- Encuadernación de tapa blanda
- Idioma
- inglés
- ISBN 10
- 0300248334
- ISBN 13
- 9780300248333
A leading scholar of Congress and the Constitution analyzes Congress’s surprisingly potent set of tools in the system of checks and balances.
Congress is widely supposed to be the least effective branch of the federal government. But as Josh Chafetz shows in this boldly original analysis, Congress in fact has numerous powerful tools at its disposal in its conflicts with the other branches. These tools include the power of the purse, the contempt power, freedom of speech and debate, and more. Drawing extensively on the historical development of Anglo-American legislatures from the seventeenth century to the present, Chafetz concludes that these tools are all means by which Congress and its members battle for public support. When Congress uses them to engage successfully with the public, it increases its power vis-à-vis the other branches; when it does not, it loses power. This groundbreaking take on the separation of powers will be of interest to both legal scholars and political scientists.
Congress is widely supposed to be the least effective branch of the federal government. But as Josh Chafetz shows in this boldly original analysis, Congress in fact has numerous powerful tools at its disposal in its conflicts with the other branches. These tools include the power of the purse, the contempt power, freedom of speech and debate, and more. Drawing extensively on the historical development of Anglo-American legislatures from the seventeenth century to the present, Chafetz concludes that these tools are all means by which Congress and its members battle for public support. When Congress uses them to engage successfully with the public, it increases its power vis-à-vis the other branches; when it does not, it loses power. This groundbreaking take on the separation of powers will be of interest to both legal scholars and political scientists.
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Acerca del autor
Josh Chafetz is professor of law at Cornell Law School. His work has appeared in top scholarly journals and in national publications, including the New York Times and the Washington Post.
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