Reactive Publishing
Modern digital markets, from automated ad exchanges and cloud resource allocation to high-frequency auctions, rely on rigorous economic frameworks. Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Auction Theory with Python bridges the gap between theoretical microeconomics and practical software implementation.
Designed for data scientists, quantitative developers, and economists, this comprehensive guide demonstrates how to engineer incentive-compatible systems, design optimal auctions, and deploy automated bidding strategies using modern Python tools.
What You Will LearnCore Auction Theory: Implement English, Dutch, First-Price, and Second-Price (Vickrey) auctions with deterministic and strategic bidding agents.
Incentive Alignment: Build and simulate Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to achieve social welfare maximization and truthfulness.
Algorithmic Bidding: Train automated bidding strategies using dynamic programming, numerical optimization, and basic multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Market Dynamics: Analyze combinatorial auctions, revenue optimization, and counter-strategies against bid shading and collusive behavior.
Basic proficiency in Python and foundational knowledge of linear algebra and probability are recommended. No prior background in formal economics is required, all necessary theoretical concepts are built from first principles.
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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Reactive PublishingModern digital markets, from automated ad exchanges and cloud resource allocation to high-frequency auctions, rely on rigorous economic frameworks. Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Auction Theory with Python bridges the gap between theoretical microeconomics and practical software implementation.Designed for data scientists, quantitative developers, and economists, this comprehensive guide demonstrates how to engineer incentive-compatible systems, design optimal auctions, and deploy automated bidding strategies using modern Python tools.What You Will LearnCore Auction Theory: Implement English, Dutch, First-Price, and Second-Price (Vickrey) auctions with deterministic and strategic bidding agents.Incentive Alignment: Build and simulate Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to achieve social welfare maximization and truthfulness.Algorithmic Bidding: Train automated bidding strategies using dynamic programming, numerical optimization, and basic multi-agent reinforcement learning.Market Dynamics: Analyze combinatorial auctions, revenue optimization, and counter-strategies against bid shading and collusive behavior.PrerequisitesBasic proficiency in Python and foundational knowledge of linear algebra and probability are recommended. No prior background in formal economics is required, all necessary theoretical concepts are built from first principles. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9798192396889
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Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido
PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. del artículo: L0-9798192396889
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Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Reactive PublishingModern digital markets, from automated ad exchanges and cloud resource allocation to high-frequency auctions, rely on rigorous economic frameworks. Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Auction Theory with Python bridges the gap between theoretical microeconomics and practical software implementation.Designed for data scientists, quantitative developers, and economists, this comprehensive guide demonstrates how to engineer incentive-compatible systems, design optimal auctions, and deploy automated bidding strategies using modern Python tools.What You Will LearnCore Auction Theory: Implement English, Dutch, First-Price, and Second-Price (Vickrey) auctions with deterministic and strategic bidding agents.Incentive Alignment: Build and simulate Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to achieve social welfare maximization and truthfulness.Algorithmic Bidding: Train automated bidding strategies using dynamic programming, numerical optimization, and basic multi-agent reinforcement learning.Market Dynamics: Analyze combinatorial auctions, revenue optimization, and counter-strategies against bid shading and collusive behavior.PrerequisitesBasic proficiency in Python and foundational knowledge of linear algebra and probability are recommended. No prior background in formal economics is required, all necessary theoretical concepts are built from first principles. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9798192396889
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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Reactive PublishingModern digital markets, from automated ad exchanges and cloud resource allocation to high-frequency auctions, rely on rigorous economic frameworks. Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Auction Theory with Python bridges the gap between theoretical microeconomics and practical software implementation.Designed for data scientists, quantitative developers, and economists, this comprehensive guide demonstrates how to engineer incentive-compatible systems, design optimal auctions, and deploy automated bidding strategies using modern Python tools.What You Will Learn- Core Auction Theory: Implement English, Dutch, First-Price, and Second-Price (Vickrey) auctions with deterministic and strategic bidding agents.- Incentive Alignment: Build and simulate Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to achieve social welfare maximization and truthfulness.- Algorithmic Bidding: Train automated bidding strategies using dynamic programming, numerical optimization, and basic multi-agent reinforcement learning.- Market Dynamics: Analyze combinatorial auctions, revenue optimization, and counter-strategies against bid shading and collusive behavior.PrerequisitesBasic proficiency in Python and foundational knowledge of linear algebra and probability are recommended. No prior background in formal economics is required, all necessary theoretical concepts are built from first principles. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9798192396889
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles