In the essays that follow, Fred Berger argues for freedom of expression, civil disobedience, affirmative action and what he calls liberal judicial activism and against sex-role stereotyping, paternalism and the censorship of pornography. Underlying his liberalism is a unified theory. That theory consists of a conception of rights, a theory of value and a theory of government. The conception of a right that Berger defends derives from J ohn Stuart Mill and is captured by what he calls "the rights formula": to have a right is to have important interests that society ought to protect as a matter of general rule (pp. 2, 7, 17-18, 19, 95). Since rights are to be protected by general rule, case-by-case consideration of consequences is ruled out (pp. 3, 18, 96) and neither modest increases in the general welfare, nor majority opinion, can justify the violation of a right (pp. 14-15; 17-18). Berger combines this view of the nature of a right with an objective theory of value according to which the important interests that ought to be protected are ones that people have "whether they know them or not, whether they desire that in which they have an interest or not" (p.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
In the essays that follow, Fred Berger argues for freedom of expression, civil disobedience, affirmative action and what he calls liberal judicial activism and against sex-role stereotyping, paternalism and the censorship of pornography. Underlying his liberalism is a unified theory. That theory consists of a conception of rights, a theory of value and a theory of government. The conception of a right that Berger defends derives from J ohn Stuart Mill and is captured by what he calls "the rights formula": to have a right is to have important interests that society ought to protect as a matter of general rule (pp. 2, 7, 17-18, 19, 95). Since rights are to be protected by general rule, case-by-case consideration of consequences is ruled out (pp. 3, 18, 96) and neither modest increases in the general welfare, nor majority opinion, can justify the violation of a right (pp. 14-15; 17-18). Berger combines this view of the nature of a right with an objective theory of value according to which the important interests that ought to be protected are ones that people have "whether they know them or not, whether they desire that in which they have an interest or not" (p.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
Condición: New. In. Nº de ref. del artículo: ria9789401054720_new
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. pp. 248. Nº de ref. del artículo: 26142320288
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 248 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam. Nº de ref. del artículo: 135011711
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Librería: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Alemania
Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 248. Nº de ref. del artículo: 18142320298
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 248 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.56 inches. In Stock. Nº de ref. del artículo: x-940105472X
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - In the essays that follow, Fred Berger argues for freedom of expression, civil disobedience, affirmative action and what he calls liberal judicial activism and against sex-role stereotyping, paternalism and the censorship of pornography. Underlying his liberalism is a unified theory. That theory consists of a conception of rights, a theory of value and a theory of government. The conception of a right that Berger defends derives from J ohn Stuart Mill and is captured by what he calls 'the rights formula': to have a right is to have important interests that society ought to protect as a matter of general rule (pp. 2, 7, 17-18, 19, 95). Since rights are to be protected by general rule, case-by-case consideration of consequences is ruled out (pp. 3, 18, 96) and neither modest increases in the general welfare, nor majority opinion, can justify the violation of a right (pp. 14-15; 17-18). Berger combines this view of the nature of a right with an objective theory of value according to which the important interests that ought to be protected are ones that people have 'whether they know them or not, whether they desire that in which they have an interest or not' (p. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9789401054720
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles