The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006): 284 (Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 284) - Tapa dura

Reseña del editor

Science aims at the discovery of general principles of special kinds that are applicable for the explanation and prediction of the phenomena of the world in the form of theories and laws. When the phenomena themselves happen to be general, the principlesinvolved assume the form of theories; and when they are p- ticular, they assume the form of general laws. Theories themselves are sets of laws and de nitions that apply to a common domain, which makes laws indispensable to science. Understanding science thus depends upon understanding the nature of theories and laws, the logical structure of explanations and predictions based upon them, and the principles of inference and decision that apply to theories and laws. Laws and theories can differ in their form as well as in their content. The laws of quantum mechanics are indeterministic (or probabilistic), for example, while those of classical mechanics are deterministic (or universal) instead. The history of science re ects an increasing role for probabilities as properties of the world but also as measures of evidential support and as degrees of subjective belief. Our purpose is to clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science.

Reseña del editor

The purpose of philosophy, broadly conceived, can be described as that of attempting to resolve heretofore unsolved conceptual and theoretical problems, especially those that lie at the foundations of knowledge and values. Given the central role of science in acquiring reliable knowledge, the study of science has become of special importance within philosophy. And within philosophy of science, in turn, no other concept possesses the centrality and importance as does that of probability. To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers from our time.

After a comprehensive introduction to alternative conceptions of objective probability and the difficulties that they confront, three studies describe the special problems that arise within this context and the comparative merits of different accounts. The second section addresses the nature of lawfulness and of relations between micro- and macro-probabilities, especially with reference to the concept of fitness in evolution. The third section confronts some of the difficulties confronted by causal conceptions of probability, especially within the quantum domain. The fourth extends the discussion to principles of inference and decision. The last chapter relates propensities and frequencies to the framework of inference to the best explanation.