How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Stefan Riedener, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
EUR 17,22 gastos de envío desde Estados Unidos de America a España
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envíoEUR 3,45 gastos de envío desde Estados Unidos de America a España
Destinos, gastos y plazos de envíoLibrería: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: New. How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. Nº de ref. del artículo: LU-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: New. How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. Nº de ref. del artículo: LU-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: California Books, Miami, FL, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. Nº de ref. del artículo: I-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de America
PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. del artículo: L0-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido
PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. del artículo: L0-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback or Softback. Condición: New. Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty 0.59. Book. Nº de ref. del artículo: BBS-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: 5 disponibles
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
Condición: New. In. Nº de ref. del artículo: ria9783111271125_new
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. 168 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: New. How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. Nº de ref. del artículo: LU-9783111271125
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 168 pages. 9.06x6.10x0.39 inches. In Stock. Nº de ref. del artículo: x-3111271129
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles