The Heuristic View: Logic, Mathematics, and Science: 502 (Synthese Library, 502) - Tapa dura

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Emiliano Ippoliti completed his PhD in Logic and Epistemology at Sapienza University of Rome in 2004. From 2006 to 2008, he held a postdoctoral position at Sapienza’s Department of Philosophy and was a visiting scholar at Penn State University in 2008. He is currently Associate Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Department of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome. His research focuses primarily on two areas: 1) Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics: He works on heuristics in mathematics and science, the logic and philosophy of discovery, and the broader epistemology of the formal sciences. He is the founder of the “Logic & Knowledge Network” (est. 2002) (https://logicandknowledge.substack.com); 2) Philosophy and Finance: His work investigates the conceptual, methodological, and epistemological dimensions of financial theory and practice. He is the founder of “Phinance: The Philosophy and Finance Network” (est. 2020) (https://phinancenet.substack.com).

Fabio Sterpetti is Researcher in Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Department of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, where he received his PhD in Philosophy in 2012. From 2013 to 2015 he has been Postdoctoral Researcher in Logic and Philosophy of Science at the same University. He then has been Postdoctoral Researcher in Logic and Philosophy of Science at Campus Bio-Medico University of Rome, Italy (2017-2018). He has been Contract Professor in Philosophy of Science (2016-2017) and in Logic (2017-2018) at the Department of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome. His research focuses on the realism/anti-realism debate in general philosophy of science and on some related issues, such as the difficulty of making scientific realism compatible with a naturalist stance. He is also interested in the debates on the method of mathematics and on the nature of logic, and in the analysis of how the heuristic view of method, especially in the form developed by Carlo Cellucci, can contribute to those debates. He co-edited, with Marta Bertolaso, the volume: “A Critical Reflection on Automated Science” (Springer, 2020), and, with Emiliano Ippoliti and Thomas Nickles, the volume: “Models and Inferences in Science” (Springer, 2016). His articles have appeared in various scientific journals, such as Synthese; History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences; Foundations of Science; Philosophia; Topoi; Axiomathes.

De la contraportada

This volume offers a series of thought-provoking analyses that explore non-mainstream perspectives on knowledge acquisition and scientific discovery. A central theme across many of the contributions is the heuristic conception of method, a view that finds its philosophical roots in Imre Lakatos’s work in the philosophy of mathematics and, more distantly, in Platonic notions of philosophical inquiry.

Knowledge acquisition is frequently conceptualized as a form of problem-solving, and problem-solving is typically regarded as a rational endeavor. However, the dominant view in the philosophy of science has long held that scientific discovery resists systematic explanation in terms of logic and rationality. If an alternative account of discovery grounded in these terms can be developed, it would represent a significant theoretical advancement.

The essays collected in this book critically assess the promise and limitations of such non-standard accounts, and they investigate the possibility of framing scientific discovery within a logical and rational framework. This volume will be of particular interest to scholars in the philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of logic, as well as to scientists engaged in theoretical inquiry and graduate students working in these or related areas.