Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel's Assaults on Gaza - Tapa blanda

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Norman G. Finkelstein received his doctorate from the Department of Politics at Princeton University. For many years he taught political theory and the Israel-Palestine conflict. He is the author of a number of books, among them Gaza: An Inquest Into Its Martyrdom; Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel's Assaults on Gaza; Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel is Coming to an End; What Gandhi Says: About Nonviolence, Resistance and Courage; "This Time We Went Too Far": Truth and Consequences of the Gaza Invasion; Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History; and The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering.

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Israel has committed three massacres in Gaza during the past five years: Operation Cast Lead (2008-9), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), and Operation Protective Edge (2014). It also killed nine foreign nationals aboard a humanitarian vessel (the Mavi Marmara) en route to deliver basic goods to Gaza's besieged population.

This book chronicles and analyzes these Israeli massacres. It casts doubt on the accepted interpretation of their key triggers, features, and consequences. Each chapter reproduces (with minor stylistic changes) the author's commentary as it was composed after each successive cessation of armed hostilities.

A trio of themes form the connective tissue of the book's narrative. First, Israel has repeatedly manufactured pretexts to achieve larger political objectives. Invariably, it resorted to military action against Hamas in order to provoke a violent response. Israel then exploited Hamas’s retaliation to launch a series of murderous assaults on Gaza.

Second, Israel has repeatedly eluded accountability for its war crimes and crimes against humanity. Both the Goldstone Report and Turkey’s attempt to prosecute Israel after the Mavi Marmara massacre proved stillborn. The prospect of an International Criminal Court indictment of Israeli leaders after Operation Protective Edge also holds out faint hope.

Third, at the end of each new round, the political balance between the antagonists did not change: each side declared victory, but neither side won. Such a stalemate has been much more tolerable for Israel than for the people of Gaza. The human and material losses suffered by Gazans have been of an incomparably greater magnitude. Moreover, Israel can live with the status quo, whereas Gaza, suffering under the double yoke of a foreign occupation and an illegal blockade, cannot. The fact that the indomitable will of the people of Gaza has repeatedly brought the Israeli killing machine to a standstill cannot but impress. However, such “negative” victories have yet to translate into a “positive” victory of a real improvement in Gaza’s daily life.

Palestinians are under neither legal nor moral obligation to desist from using armed force against Israel. Nonetheless, it is this author’s contention that nonviolent mass resistance, both in Gaza and by its supporters abroad, still offers the best prospect for ending the illegal siege and occupation of Gaza. Armed resistance has been attempted many times and, notwithstanding its heroism and nobility, has failed to budge Israel a jot. The time is ripe to attempt militant nonviolent resistance, or so it is argued in the ensuing pages.