U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, is the second installment in the two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. As the U.S. government wrestles with tough questions on how to bring peace and stability to countries torn by internal strife, Andrew J. Birtle provides context for these concerns by describing how the United States attempted to suppress insurgencies and build nations during the Cold War. Employing a range of primary and secondary sources, Birtle explains how the Army in the 1950s and 1960s developed a dual strategy that combined military measures with political and socioeconomic reforms. On the military side, he states, doctrine advocated aggressive offensive operations, elaborate intelligence networks, and extensive security measures to drive the guerrillas away from inhabited areas and to secure the population from rebel influence and intimidation. On the civil side, Birtle continues, doctrine called for the implementation of measures to restore the norms of social and economic life; to establish efficient and popular government; and to redress, when possible, the causes of unrest. Birtle uses case studies of counterinsurgency wars in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Latin America, and Vietnam to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the nation's approach to counterinsurgency. Although the United States' counterinsurgency record was mixed, Birtle shows that the precepts underpinning U.S. doctrine have remained surprisingly constant over the years. By furnishing an in-depth look at how the Army performed its counterinsurgency and nation-building responsibilities during a previous era of global instability, Birtle sheds some needed light on the work that must be done today and tomorrow.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, is the second installment in the two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. As the U.S. government wrestles with tough questions on how to bring peace and stability to countries torn by internal strife, Andrew J. Birtle provides context for these concerns by describing how the United States attempted to suppress insurgencies and build nations during the Cold War. Employing a range of primary and secondary sources, Birtle explains how the Army in the 1950s and 1960s developed a dual strategy that combined military measures with political and socioeconomic reforms. On the military side, he states, doctrine advocated aggressive offensive operations, elaborate intelligence networks, and extensive security measures to drive the guerrillas away from inhabited areas and to secure the population from rebel influence and intimidation. On the civil side, Birtle continues, doctrine called for the implementation of measures to restore the norms of social and economic life; to establish efficient and popular government; and to redress, when possible, the causes of unrest. Birtle uses case studies of counterinsurgency wars in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Latin America, and Vietnam to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the nation's approach to counterinsurgency. Although the United States' counterinsurgency record was mixed, Birtle shows that the precepts underpinning U.S. doctrine have remained surprisingly constant over the years. By furnishing an in-depth look at how the Army performed its counterinsurgency and nation-building responsibilities during a previous era of global instability, Birtle sheds some needed light on the work that must be done today and tomorrow.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Librería: -OnTimeBooks-, Phoenix, AZ, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: very_good. Gently read. May have name of previous ownership, or ex-library edition. Binding tight; spine straight and smooth, with no creasing; covers clean and crisp. Minimal signs of handling or shelving. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item for full refund. Ships USPS Media Mail. Nº de ref. del artículo: OTV.1508650470.VG
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G1508650470I5N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: California Books, Miami, FL, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. Print on Demand. Nº de ref. del artículo: I-9781508650478
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: New. Nº de ref. del artículo: ABLING22Oct2018170169811
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Reino Unido
Paperback / softback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days. Nº de ref. del artículo: C9781508650478
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, is the second installment in the two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. As the U.S. government wrestles with tough questions on how to bring peace and stability to countries torn by internal strife, Andrew J. Birtle provides context for these concerns by describing how the United States attempted to suppress insurgencies and build nations during the Cold War. Employing a range of primary and secondary sources, Birtle explains how the Army in the 1950s and 1960s developed a dual strategy that combined military measures with political and socioeconomic reforms. On the military side, he states, doctrine advocated aggressive offensive operations, elaborate intelligence networks, and extensive security measures to drive the guerrillas away from inhabited areas and to secure the population from rebel influence and intimidation. On the civil side, Birtle continues, doctrine called for the implementation of measures to restore the norms of social and economic life; to establish efficient and popular government; and to redress, when possible, the causes of unrest. Birtle uses case studies of counterinsurgency wars in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Latin America, and Vietnam to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the nation's approach to counterinsurgency. Although the United States' counterinsurgency record was mixed, Birtle shows that the precepts underpinning U.S. doctrine have remained surprisingly constant over the years. By furnishing an in-depth look at how the Army performed its counterinsurgency and nation-building responsibilities during a previous era of global instability, Birtle sheds some needed light on the work that must be done today and tomorrow. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9781508650478
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles