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John Portmann is the author of When Bad Things Happen to Other People and the editor of In Defense of Sin. A self-described liberal Catholic, Portmann lives in Charlottesville, Virginia.

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In Defense of Sin

Palgrave MacMillan

Chapter One

In Defense of
Idolatry

Often considered synonymous with paganism, idolatry signifiesworship of physical representations of gods. Whereas paganism alwayshad room for one more god, the ancient Hebrews followed a newreligion, one in which there was really only one God. Monotheism wasa radically new idea.

    Idolatry offends God as few other sins can. According to Jewishtradition, for example, all the laws of the Torah save three?murder,idolatry, and adultery?may be broken in order to save a human life.

    Ever since Abraham revolted against his idolatrous father, monotheismhas represented steadfast opposition to idol worship. LudwigFeuerbach turns this opposition on its head and argues that, withoutrealizing it, all practice idolatry. Unwittingly, he claims, religiousbelievers violate the very rule against idolatry they themselves devised.

    In this excerpt from 1841, Feuerbach asserts that God is a creationof the human imagination. Feuerbach applauds humanity for havingused its imagination so creatively. God is the highest achievement ofhuman art, Feuerbach insists, and man is himself God. Feuerbachdefends idolatry (or Christianity?for he saw them as one and thesame) because it amounts to worshiping humanity.

    Feuerbach wondered why religion was universal and why so manyreligions instructed people to humble themselves before a greaterpower. Each culture uses its religion to project its highest ideals intothe sky, he concluded. The problem, according to Feuerbach, was thatwe consequently view ourselves as sinful, fallen creatures instead ofcongratulating ourselves for having come up with such a wonderfulidea.

    According to Feuerbach, we cannot get to know ourselves unlesswe get to know God, who is our own reflection. Although he insistedhe was not an atheist, Feuerbach's philosophy unsettled people widely.His famous cry, "To enrich man, one must impoverish God," may notexactly shock twenty-first century believers, but it can hardly fail tobother them at some level. For liberating ourselves from the idea ofsin comes at the cost of diminishing God. This trade-off between manand God sets the stage for defending sin and is the theme of this book.

* * *

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) made a great splash in Europeupon the publication of The Essence of Christianity (1841). Hisargument that God is merely the outward projection of man's inwardessence scandalized contemporary society. Born in Bavaria, he traveledto Berlin to study under Hegel, an eminent philosopher. AlthoughFeuerbach never managed to surpass his first work, he inspired anotherinfluential thinker: Karl Marx.

from

THE ESSENCE
OF CHRISTIANITY

Ludwig Feuerbach
translated by George Eliot

... Now, when it is shown that what the subject is lies entirely in theattributes of the subject; that is, that the predicate is the true subject; itis also proved that if the divine predicates are attributes of the humannature, the subject of those predicates is also of the human nature. Butthe divine predicates are partly general, partly personal. The generalpredicates are the metaphysical, but these serve only as external points ofsupport to religion; they are not the characteristic definitions of religion.It is the personal predicates alone which constitute the essence ofreligion?in which the Divine Being is the object of religion. Such are,for example, that God is a Person, that he is the moral Lawgiver, theFather of mankind, the Holy One, the Just, the Good, the Merciful. Itis, however, at once clear, or it will at least be clr in the sequel, withregard to these and other definitions, that, especially as applied to apersonality, they are purely human definitions, and that consequentlyman in religion?in his relation to God?is in relation to his own nature;for to the religious sentiment these predicates are not mere conceptions,mere images, which man forms of God, to be distinguished from thatwhich God is in himself, but truths, facts, realities. Religion knowsnothing of anthropomorphisms; to it they are not anthropomorphisms.It is the very essence of religion, that to it these definitions express thenature of God. They are pronounced to be images only by the understanding,which reflects on religion, and which while defending themyet before its own tribunal denies them. But to the religious sentimentGod is a real Father, real Love and Mercy; for to it he is a real, living,personal being, and therefore his attributes are also living and personal.Nay, the definitions which are the most sufficing to the religioussentiment are precisely those which give the most offence to theunderstanding, and which in the process of reflection on religion itdenies. Religion is essentially emotion; hence, objectively also, emotionis to it necessarily of a divine nature. Even anger appears to it an emotionnot unworthy of God, provided only there be a religious motive at thefoundation of this anger.

    But here it is also essential to observe, and this phenomenon is anextremely remarkable one, characterising the very core of religion, thatin proportion as the divine subject is in reality human, the greater is theapparent difference between God and man; that is, the more by reflectionon religion, by theology, is the identity of the divine and human denied,and the human, considered as such, is depreciated. The reason of thisis, that as what is positive in the conception of the divine being can onlybe human, the conception of man, as an object of consciousness, canonly be negative. To enrich God, man must become poor; that God maybe all, man must be nothing. But he desires to be nothing in himself,because what he takes from himself is not lost to him, since it is preservedin God. Man has his being in God; why then should he have it in himself?Where is the necessity of positing the same thing twice, of having it twice?What man withdraws from himself, what he renounces in himself, heonly enjoys in an incomparably higher and fuller measure in God.

    The monks made a vow of chastity to God; they mortified the sexualpassion in themselves, but therefore they had in heaven, in the VirginMary, the image of woman?an image of love. They could the moreeasily dispense with real woman in proportion as an ideal woman was anobject of love to them. The greater the importance they attached to thedenial of sensuality, the greater the importance of the heavenly virgin forthem: she was to them in the place of Christ, in the stead of God. Themore the sensual tendencies are renounced, the more sensual is the Godto whom they are sacrificed. For whatever is made an offering to Godhas an especial value attached to it; in it God is supposed to have especialpleasure. That which is the highest in the estimation of man is naturallythe highest in the estimation of his God; what pleases man pleases Godalso. The Hebrews did not offer to Jehovah unclean, ill-conditionedanimals; on the contrary, those which they most highly prized, whichthey themselves ate, were also the food of God (Cibus Dei, Lev. iii.2).Wherever, therefore, the denial of the sensual delights is made a specialoffering, a sacrifice well-pleasing to God, there the highest value isattached to the senses, and the sensuality which has been renounced isunconsciously restored, in the fact that God takes the place of thematerial delights which have been renounced. The nun weds herself toGod; she has a heavenly bridegroom, the monk a heavenly bride. But theheavenly virgin is only a sensible presentation of a general truth, havingrelation to the essence of religion. Man denies as to himself only whathe attributes to God. Religion abstracts from man, from the world; butit can only abstract from the limitations, from the phenomena; in short,from the negative, not from the essence, the positive, of the world andhumanity: hence, in the very abstraction and negation it must recoverthat from which it abstracts, or believes itself to abstract. And thus, inreality, whatever religion consciously denies?always supposing thatwhat is denied by it is something essential, true, and consequentlyincapable of being ultimately denied?it unconsciously restores in God.Thus, in religion man denies his reason; of himself he knows nothing ofGod, his thoughts are only worldly, earthly; he can only believe whatGod reveals to him. But on this account the thoughts of God are human,earthly thoughts: like man, he has plans in his mind, he accommodateshimself to circumstances and grades of intelligence, like a tutor with hispupils; he calculates closely the effect of his gifts and revelations; heobserves man in all his doings; he knows all things, even the most earthly,the commonest, the most trivial. In brief, man in relation to God denieshis own knowledge, his own thoughts, that he may place them in God.Man gives up his personality; but in return, God, the Almighty, infinite,unlimited being, is a person; he denies human dignity, the human ego;but in return God is to him a selfish, egoistical being, who in all thingsseeks only himself, his own honour, his own ends; he represents God assimply seeking the satisfaction of his own selfishness, while yet he frownson that of every other being; his God is the very luxury of egoism.Religion further denies goodness as a quality of human nature; man iswicked, corrupt, incapable of good; but, on the other hand, God is onlygood?the Good Being. Man's nature demands as an object goodness,personified as God; but is it not hereby declared that goodness is anessential tendency of man? If my heart is wicked, my understandingperverted, how can I perceive and feel the holy to be holy, the good tobe good? Could I perceive the beauty of a fine picture if my mind wereaesthetically an absolute piece of perversion? Though I may not be apainter, though I may not have the power of producing what is beautifulmyself, I must yet have æsthetic feeling, æsthetic comprehension, sinceI perceive the beauty that is presented to me externally. Either goodnessdoes not exist at all for man, or, if it does exist, therein is revealed to theindividual man the holiness and goodness of human nature. That whichis absolutely opposed to my nature, to which I am united by no bond ofsympathy, is not even conceivable or perceptible by me. The holy is inopposition to me only as regards the modifications of my personality,but as regards my fundamental nature it is in unity with me. The holyis a reproach to my sinfulness; in it I recognise myself as a sinner; but inso doing, while I blame myself, I acknowledge what I am not, but oughtto be, and what, for that very reason, I, according to my destination, canbe; for an "ought" which has no corresponding capability does not affectme, is a ludicrous chimæra without any true relation to my mentalconstitution. But when I acknowledge goodness as my destination, asmy law, I acknowledge it, whether consciously or unconsciously, as myown nature. Another nature than my own, one different in quality,cannot touch me. I can perceive sin as sin, only when I perceive it to bea contradiction of myself with myself that?is, of my personality withmy fundamental nature. As a contradiction of the absolute, consideredas another being, the feeling of sin is inexplicable, unmeaning.

    The distinction between Augustinianism and Pelagianism consistsonly in this, that the former expresses after the manner of religion whatthe latter expresses after the manner of Rationalism. Both say the samething, both vindicate the goodness of man; but Pelagianism does itdirectly, in a rationalistic and moral form; Augustinianism indirectly, ina mystical, that is, a religious form. For that which is given to man'sGod is in truth given to man himself; what a man declares concerningGod, he in truth declares concerning himself. Augustinianism would bea truth, and a truth opposed to Pelagianism, only if man had the devilfor his God, and, with the consciousness that he was the devil, honoured,reverenced, and worshipped him as the highest being. But so long as manadores a good being as his God, so long does he contemplate in God thegoodness of his own nature.

    As with the doctrine of the radical corruption of human nature, sois it with the identical doctrine, that man can do nothing good, i.e., intruth, nothing of himself?by his own strength. For the denial of humanstrength and spontaneous moral activity to be true, the moral activity ofGod must also be denied; and we must say, with the Oriental nihilist orpantheist: the Divine being is absolutely without will or action, indifferent,knowing nothing of the discrimination between evil and good. Buthe who defines God as an active being, and not only so, but as morallyactive and morally critical,?as a being who lives, works, and rewardsgood, punishes, rejects, and condemns evil,?he who thus defines Godonly in appearance denies human activity, in fact, making it the highest,the most real activity. He who makes God act humanly, declares humanactivity to be divine; he says: A god who is not active, and not morallyor humanly active, is no god; and thus he makes the idea of the Godheaddependent on the idea of activity, that is, of human activity, for a higher[being] he knows not.

    Man?this is the mystery of religion?projects his being intoobjectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projectedimage of himself thus converted into a subject; he thinks of himself [nota]s an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another beingthan himself. Thus here. Man is an object to God. That man is good orevil is not indifferent to God; no! He has a lively, profound interest inman's being good; he wills that man should be good, happy?for withoutgoodness there is no happiness. Thus the religious man virtually retractsthe nothingness of human activity, by making his dispositions andactions an object to God, by making man the end of God?for that whichis an object to the mind is an end in action; by making the divine activitya means of human salvation. God acts, that man may be good and happy.Thus man, while he is apparently humiliated to the lowest degree, is intruth exalted to the highest. Thus, in and through God, man has in viewhimself alone. It is true that man places the aim of his action in God, butGod has no other aim of action than the moral and eternal salvation ofman: thus man has in fact no other aim than himself. The divine activityis not distinct from the human.

    How could the divine activity work on me as its object, nay, workin me, if it were essentially different from me; how could it have a humanaim, the aim of ameliorating and blessing man, if it were not itselfhuman? Does not the purpose determine the nature of the act? Whenman makes his moral improvement an aim to himself, he has divineresolutions, divine projects; but also, when God seeks the salvation ofman, he has human ends and a human mode of activity correspondingto these ends. Thus in God man has only his own activity as an object.But for the very reason that he regards his own activity as objective,goodness only as an object, he necessarily receives the impulse, the motivenot from himself, but from this object. He contemplates his nature asexternal to himself, and this nature as goodness; thus it is self-evident, itis mere tautology to say that the impulse to good comes only from thencewhere he places the good.

    God is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself;hence man can do nothing of himself, all goodness comes from God.The more subjective God is, the more completely does man divesthimself of his subjectivity, because God is, per se, his relinquished self,the possession of which he however again vindicates to himself. As theaction of the arteries drives the blood into the extremities, and the actionof the veins brings it back again, as life in general consists in a perpetualsystole and diastole; so is it in religion. In the religious systole man propelshis own nature from himself, he throws himself outward; in the religiousdiastole he receives the rejected nature into his heart again. God alone isthe being who acts of himself,?this is the force of repulsion in religion;God is the being who acts in me, with me, through me, upon me, forme, is the principle of my salvation, of my good dispositions and actions,consequently my own good principle and nature,?this is the force ofattraction in religion.

    The course of religious development which has been generallyindicated consists specifically in this, that man abstracts more and morefrom God, and attributes more and more to himself. This is especiallyapparent in the belief in revelation. That which to a later age or a culturedpeople is given by nature or reason, is to an earlier age, or to a yetuncultured people, given by God. Every tendency of man, howevernatural?even the impulse to cleanliness, was conceived by the Israelitesas a positive divine ordinance. From this example we again see that Godis lowered, is conceived more entirely on the type of ordinary humanity,in proportion as man detracts from himself. How can the self-humiliationof man go further than when he disclaims the capability of fulfillingspontaneously the requirements of common decency? The Christianreligion, on the other hand, distinguished the impulses and passions ofman according to their quality, their character; it represented only goodemotions, good dispositions, good thoughts, as revelations, operations?thatis, as dispositions, feelings, thoughts,?of God; for what God revealsis a quality of God himself: that of which the heart is full overflows thelips; as is the effect such is the cause; as the revelation, such the beingwho reveals himself. A God who reveals himself in good dispositions isa God whose essential attribute is only moral perfection. The Christianreligion distinguishes inward moral purity from external physical purity;the Israelites identified the two. In relation to the Israelitish religion,the Christian religion is one of criticism and freedom. The Israelitetrusted himself to do nothing except what was commanded by God; hewas without will even in external things; the authority of religionextended itself even to his food. The Christian religion, on the otherhand, in all these external things made man dependent on himself, i.e.,placed in man what the Israelite placed out of himself in God. Israel isthe most complete presentation of Positivism in religion. In relation tothe Israelite, the Christian is an esprit fort, a free-thinker. Thus do thingschange. What yesterday was still religion is no longer such to-day; andwhat to-day is atheism, tomorrow will be religion.

Continues...

Excerpted from In Defense of Sinby John Portmann Copyright © 2003 by John Portmann. Excerpted by permission.
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