During the Vietnam conflict the United States along with the South Vietnam government were able to convince 194,000 enemy personnel to change sides. The majority of these individuals were then exploited for intelligence, propaganda, and other capabilities beneficial to the allies and detrimental to the communist cause. The United States has a long history of using defector operations stretching back to the War of Independence and on through to the end of the Cold War. In spite of this history of experience there is barely a mention of defector operations in modern unclassified doctrine; nor, more importantly, have defector operations been employed as a weapon against Al Qaeda. The insurgents of the last century were particularly appropriate targets for defector operations due to the specific nature of their fight. Because insurgencies by definition are intent on overthrowing an established government they, for the vast majority of the cases, have certain common characteristics. Insurgencies, at least during the initial phases of their struggle, are inherently weaker and poorer then the established government and at a disadvantage in manning and equipping. Insurgencies, also, must be able to conceal themselves from the authorities while still maintaining contact with the populace. With common characteristics and a common objective, common Lines of Operations can be established for insurgencies. These insurgency Lines of Operations are: Information Operations, Secrecy, Establishing Safe Base of Operations, Establishing Support, Gaining New Members, and Creating and Maintaining an Internal Structure. Though Al Qaeda appears unique and holey unimaginable fifty years ago it too uses these same lines of operations in its struggle. For Al Qaeda, with its objective of overthrowing the ruling governments of the Middle East, is an insurgency. Al Qaeda is different than the prior communist insurgencies, Al Qaeda uses religion as the primary component of its cause, relies heav
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During the Vietnam conflict the United States along with the South Vietnam government were able to convince 194,000 enemy personnel to change sides. The majority of these individuals were then exploited for intelligence, propaganda, and other capabilities beneficial to the allies and detrimental to the communist cause. The United States has a long history of using defector operations stretching back to the War of Independence and on through to the end of the Cold War. In spite of this history of experience there is barely a mention of defector operations in modern unclassified doctrine; nor, more importantly, have defector operations been employed as a weapon against Al Qaeda. The insurgents of the last century were particularly appropriate targets for defector operations due to the specific nature of their fight. Because insurgencies by definition are intent on overthrowing an established government they, for the vast majority of the cases, have certain common characteristics. Insurgencies, at least during the initial phases of their struggle, are inherently weaker and poorer then the established government and at a disadvantage in manning and equipping. Insurgencies, also, must be able to conceal themselves from the authorities while still maintaining contact with the populace. With common characteristics and a common objective, common Lines of Operations can be established for insurgencies. These insurgency Lines of Operations are: Information Operations, Secrecy, Establishing Safe Base of Operations, Establishing Support, Gaining New Members, and Creating and Maintaining an Internal Structure. Though Al Qaeda appears unique and holey unimaginable fifty years ago it too uses these same lines of operations in its struggle. For Al Qaeda, with its objective of overthrowing the ruling governments of the Middle East, is an insurgency. Al Qaeda is different than the prior communist insurgencies, Al Qaeda uses religion as the primary component of its cause, relies heav
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - During the Vietnam conflict the United States along with the South Vietnam government were able to convince 194,000 enemy personnel to change sides. The majority of these individuals were then exploited for intelligence, propaganda, and other capabilities beneficial to the allies and detrimental to the communist cause. The United States has a long history of using defector operations stretching back to the War of Independence and on through to the end of the Cold War. In spite of this history of experience there is barely a mention of defector operations in modern unclassified doctrine; nor, more importantly, have defector operations been employed as a weapon against Al Qaeda. The insurgents of the last century were particularly appropriate targets for defector operations due to the specific nature of their fight. Because insurgencies by definition are intent on overthrowing an established government they, for the vast majority of the cases, have certain common characteristics. Insurgencies, at least during the initial phases of their struggle, are inherently weaker and poorer then the established government and at a disadvantage in manning and equipping. Insurgencies, also, must be able to conceal themselves from the authorities while still maintaining contact with the populace. With common characteristics and a common objective, common Lines of Operations can be established for insurgencies. These insurgency Lines of Operations are: Information Operations, Secrecy, Establishing Safe Base of Operations, Establishing Support, Gaining New Members, and Creating and Maintaining an Internal Structure. Though Al Qaeda appears unique and holey unimaginable fifty years ago it too uses these same lines of operations in its struggle. For Al Qaeda, with its objective of overthrowing the ruling governments of the Middle East, is an insurgency. Al Qaeda is different than the prior communist insurgencies, Al Qaeda uses religion as the primary component of its cause, relies heav. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9781288322916
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