THE SEDENTARY REVOLUTION

Pooling and Reciprocity

Since Marcel Mauss, anthropologists have studied how primitive societies are based on the principle of reciprocity. But an ambiguity remains with regard to reciprocity: should gift giving (redistribution) taking place within a single house hold be regarded as constituting reciprocity? In other words, how should we distinguish between reciprocity and the pooling of resources? For example, within the house hold, the basic unit of clan society, we find pooling and redistribution, but these cannot properly be called reciprocal. Even if these constitute a kind of gift giving, they are not carried out with the expectation of receiving a countergift. Accordingly, Bronislaw Malinowski, who researched the Trobriand Islands, distinguished transactions on the basis of motive, differentiating between those that were carried out for self-interest and those that were disinterested. In other words, he distinguished between reciprocal and pure forms of gift giving. Gift giving within house holds or small clan communities are instances of pure giving, characterized by an absence of the principle of reciprocity. But Mauss believed that even instances of what appeared to be pure gift giving were actually governed by reciprocity. If the donor feels a sense of satisfaction, then that in itself constitutes a kind of reciprocity, just as it does when the recipient feels a certain sense of obligation.

In clan societies it is difficult to distinguish between pure and reciprocal gift giving, between pooling and reciprocity. Marshall Sahlins, however, tries to draw a clear distinction between them: he argues that pooling is an activity occurring within a single house hold, whereas reciprocity occurs between house holds:

Pooling abolishes the differentiation of the parts in favor of the coherence of the whole; it is the constituting activity of a group. On the other hand, the house hold is thereby distinguished forever from others of its kind. With these other houses, a given group might eventually entertain reciprocal relations. But reciprocity is always a "between" relation: however solidary, it can only perpetuate the separate economic identities of those who so exchange

Lewis Henry Morgan called the program of the domestic economy "communism in living." The name seems apposite, for house holding is the highest form of economic sociability: "from each according to his abilities and to each according to his needs"—from the adults that with which they are charged by the division of labor; to them, but also to the elders, the children, the incapacitated, regardless of their contributions, that which they require. The sociological precipitate is a group with an interest and destiny apart from those outside and a prior claim on the sentiments and resources of those within. Pooling closes the domestic circle; the circumference becomes a line of social and economic demarcation. Sociologists call it a "primary group"; people call it "home."

What Morgan discovered as "communism in living" and what Marx called "primitive communism" can only exist in band societies, consisting of a limited number of house holds. Pooling that exists in clan societies is already under the sway of the principle of reciprocity. This is why Sahlins acknowledges that the principle of reciprocity penetrates into the house hold. Yet it is important that we retain the distinction between pooling and reciprocity.

It is also important to distinguish between the reciprocity of the gift and trade. For this purpose, Sahlins defines two extreme poles in order to explain how reciprocal exchanges are of a completely different nature from trade. At one extreme, reciprocity takes the form of pure gift giving, and at the other extreme, it takes the form of something like a war of reprisal. Moreover, he attempts to see how the character of reciprocity is spatially defined within the community. In other words, he thinks that the character of reciprocity displays different aspects depending on whether it is positioned in the core or on the periphery of the community. It can be differentiated into three levels, depending on relative kinship distance from the core house hold (family).

1 Core (the family): generalized reciprocity / the pole of solidarity (within a lineage)

2 Within a settlement: balanced reciprocity / the midpoint (within the sphere of a tribe)

3 Between tribes: negative reciprocity / the pole of asociality

Generalized reciprocity, the first item, is the kind of reciprocity found within a house hold (family). But it appears to be a kind of pure gift giving. Accordingly, insofar as we confine ourselves to looking within the core of the community, reciprocity gives the impression of being purely altruistic, filled with good will. We have to keep in mind, however, that there are two kinds of reciprocity: positive and negative. The negative form of reciprocity appears in the third example, between tribes. As examples of this, Sahlins discusses haggling, chicanery, and theft , and we could also more broadly include here the kind of reciprocity found in a vendetta. Even reciprocity that appears at first glance to be positive in fact harbors antagonism. For example, in a potlatch ceremony one subjugates others by showering gift s on them that they are unable to reciprocate.

In relation to these two extremes, the second example, which takes place within the sphere of a single settlement, represents the midpoint. If it approaches the first type, reciprocity takes on a positive form and even approaches the state of nonreciprocal pure giving. But if it approaches the third type, it becomes negative and antisocial. It is at the midpoint between these two that balanced reciprocity appears. Hence, we can conclude that reciprocity has different functions depending on its spatial deployment. In this case, the space of tribal society is not simply a space that spreads out horizontally from its core. Tribal society is stratified: its clans are composed of individual house holds, the tribe itself of clans, and above those we have confederations composed of tribes. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that the core is positioned near the lowest stratum, while the sphere between tribes is positioned near the highest stratum.

At any rate, it seems that we should think of the characteristics of reciprocity not so much in terms of the second type (balanced reciprocity) but rather of the first and third types—that is, in terms of the reciprocity that exists within communities on the scale of a single house hold and the reciprocity that exists in relations with other communities. In the first type, it is clear that reciprocity can lead to pooling or equalization. Consequently, it is easy to confuse reciprocity and pooling. In the third type, we see how reciprocity in gift giving can create amicable relations between previously hostile communities. Moreover, we see how reciprocity provides the principle for expansion of the community.

Trade and War

I would like to examine the nature of the third type, reciprocity in the form of a relation to the exterior. Clan societies do not exist in isolation from other groups. This is because they need to engage in trade of various goods. But economic exchanges between clans are possible only in cases where they belong to some higher-order collective or, absent that, when mutually amicable relations exist between them. Both of these situations are produced through acts of gift giving.

We can see one example of this in the kula exchanges from the Trobriand Islands, as reported by Malinowski in his Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Kula is a mode of exchange carried out between a large number of clans who live within a wide sphere enclosed by a ring of islands. Kula is carefully distinguished from what is called gimwali, a purely economic exchange of useful goods. That is to say, kula is not carried out for profit or to fill actual needs. A kind of currency called veigun is used in conducting kula. When people are given veigun, they are obligated to then give it away to someone else. In this way, veigun circulate from island to island. As a result, "sociable" relations between peoples living on the various islands, ordinarily isolated from one another, are reconfirmed.

It goes without saying that kula is of a different nature from economic exchange. It is a competitive ritual of ostentatious displays of generosity in the form of gift giving. But what is important here is that kula is followed by bartering for material necessities. In other words, it is not the case that economic exchanges are looked down on in this society. It is precisely because they are necessary that the need arises to establish relationships that will render them possible. Kula occurs within the sphere of a higher-order community that links together the various islands. This ritual of gift giving reconfirms and reactivates the already existing confederation of tribes.

There are also cases of gift giving being used to open up exchanges with previously unknown others—for example, the practice of silent trade. In it, one places some article in an already-established place, gives a signal, and then hides—whereupon the other party appears, places an article thought to be of equal value next to the first article, and then departs. If the two parties are both satisfied with the article supplied by the other, they take it home and a trade is realized. In this way, useful goods are exchanged, but contact between the two parties is avoided. This is different from the reciprocity of gift giving, but it partakes of the same mode: the exchange of useful goods (commodity exchange) is executed in a reciprocal form. Accordingly, silent trade shows how trade (commodity exchange) is made possible.

Next let us examine the wars that are another possible outcome in encounters between different tribes or clans. Claude Lévi-Strauss believed that peaceful relations between communities were established through gift giving, whereas a failure in this led to war. But Pierre Clastres has criticized this view, arguing that it overlooks how primitive societies have changed due to interference and influence from the contemporary West. As a rule, the earliest folkloric records show that such societies were in fact extremely belligerent. Clastres points out that the Yanomami tribe of the Amazonian backcountry, which has had no contact with the outside world, engages in endless warfare; he asserts that war is not simply caused by a failure in exchange but rather is the reigning presumption. Exchange (gift giving) is carried out, if anything, for the sake of establishing alliances that are useful in waging war. In his view, war brings about decentralization within the interior of the community. Thanks to this warfare, the formation of a centralized state is rendered impossible. It is precisely the ceaseless warfare between tribes that explains why such communities do not transform into states.

But the warfare that Clastres sees in the Yanomami tribe occurs within a higher-dimension community. It is of a different nature from war waged against the outside world. The wars that Lévi-Strauss described as arising from a failure to secure peace through gift giving pertained to encounters between a higher-order community and its exterior. Accordingly, the existence of warfare within the tribal community does not amount to a negation of the principle of reciprocity: this sort of warfare is in fact a kind of reciprocity. In many ways it resembles vendetta or potlatch. By waging war the tribes are attempting to vanquish their rivals, and there are even cases of extermination. But this is not done for the purpose of subordinating those rivals. War is carried out for the sake of one's "honor"; it is a kind of sacrifice. It helps build a sense of cohesion and identity for each of the participating clan communities and does not lead to the conquest of other clans. Accordingly, just as is the case in vendettas, warfare here is carried out endlessly. This sort of war exists because there is no transcendent power capable of towering over the various clans and tribes—in other words, because there is no state—just as this war is what renders the establishment of such a state impossible.

Reciprocity impedes the formation of the state through its positive character (amicability), but even more so through its negative character (war). Reciprocity impedes the concentration of power, the formation of a higher stratum. Reciprocal gift giving generates close bonds between communities and a higher-order community—in other words, reciprocal gift giving leads to the stratification of communities. But this is not at all hierarchical. Reciprocity does not recognize one community (clan or tribe) as standing in a higher position, nor does it recognize one chief as standing in a position superior to other chiefs. It does not permit the establishment of a state.

Stratification

Through the reciprocity of the gift , the community leaves behind the "state of nature" in its relation with another community, producing instead the condition of peace. The state likewise represents an overcoming of the natural condition, but the peace obtained through gift giving is of a fundamentally different nature. A higher-order community is established through gift giving, one different in nature from the agrarian community organized under the state. Sahlins describes the role filled by the gift:

The gift, however, would not organize society in a corporate sense, only in a segmentary sense. Reciprocity is a "between" relation. It does not dissolve the separate parties within a higher unity, but on the contrary, in correlating their opposition, perpetuates it. Neither does the gift specify a third party standing over and above the separate interests of those who contract.... The gift is no sacrifice of equality and never of liberty. The groups allied by exchange each retain their strength, if not the inclination to use it.

Unlike the agrarian community that is organized by and subordinated to the state, the higher-order community formed through gift giving neither unites nor subordinates the lower-order communities. In tribal societies, even if a higher-order community is established, the independence of the lower-order communities does not disappear. In that sense, antagonism continues to exist within the interior of the tribe. As a result, while gift giving builds amicable relations with other communities, it also frequently becomes aggressively competitive. In potlatch, for example, the goal is to overwhelm one's rivals by giving in such excess that they are unable to reciprocate. Of course, this is not done for the sake of ruling over others. It is carried out for the sake of defending the independence (honor) of the community—in other words, of liberating it from the threat posed by other communities. It is also for the sake of strengthening the sense of identity within the community.

In this sense, vendetta is also an instance of reciprocity. For example, when a member of one community is murdered by a member of another community, revenge (reciprocation) is pursued. The "obligation" for reciprocation here strongly resembles the "obligation" of gift-countergift. When a member of the community is killed, it is a loss to the community and hence can only be repaid by imposing a similar loss on the perpetrator's community. But once a vendetta is initiated and revenge obtained, this in turn must be reciprocated, so that the process continues without end. The gift exchanges of a potlatch sometimes continue until both communities completely exhaust their resources, and it is the same with vendetta. Vendetta is abolished only when a higher-order structure capable of sitting in judgment of crime arises: the state. This shows, in reverse, how the existence of vendetta impedes the formation of a state. This is because vendetta restores the independence of each community from the higher-order structure.

The reciprocity of the gift, as the trade in kula shows, establishes a federation among multiple communities—a kind of world system. This kind of league is not stable and always harbors much internal chaos, meaning that it must from time to time be reconfirmed through additional reciprocal acts of gift giving. The unity of the community established through reciprocity is segmentary in nature. To wit, it does not become a structure capable of governing from above—a state. Most likely, we can situate the form of chiefdom as a further extension of this sort of tribal confederation. This represents the stage just before the emergence of the state. Even here, however, the principle of reciprocity that resists the state remains in effect. The state will only emerge after a nonreciprocal mode of exchange becomes dominant.