In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy, adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy, is the author of Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Librería: BooksRun, Philadelphia, PA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Fair. 1. The item might be beaten up but readable. May contain markings or highlighting, as well as stains, bent corners, or any other major defect, but the text is not obscured in any way. Nº de ref. del artículo: 0813190150-7-1
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats. Nº de ref. del artículo: CIN0813190150G
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I3N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Reno, Reno, NV, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I4N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I4N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I3N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I4N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp. Nº de ref. del artículo: P02S-01149
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: The Maryland Book Bank, Baltimore, MD, Estados Unidos de America
paperback. Condición: Very Good. 1st Edition. Used - Very Good. Nº de ref. del artículo: 2-W-5-0659
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: World of Books Inc, Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats. Nº de ref. del artículo: CIN0813190150G
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles