In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats.
"Sinopsis" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy, adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy, is the author of Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.
"Sobre este título" puede pertenecer a otra edición de este libro.
Librería: BooksRun, Philadelphia, PA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Fair. 1. The item might be beaten up but readable. May contain markings or highlighting, as well as stains, bent corners, or any other major defect, but the text is not obscured in any way. Nº de ref. del artículo: 0813190150-7-1
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I3N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Nº de ref. del artículo: G0813190150I3N00
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. Nº de ref. del artículo: 17201025-6
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Midtown Scholar Bookstore, Harrisburg, PA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Acceptable. Acceptable - This is a significantly damaged book. It should be considered a reading copy only. Please order this book only if you are interested in the content and not the condition. May be ex-library. PAPERBACK Standard-sized. Nº de ref. del artículo: M0813190150Z4
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Librería: Midtown Scholar Bookstore, Harrisburg, PA, Estados Unidos de America
Paperback. Condición: Good. Good - Bumped and creased book with tears to the extremities, but not affecting the text block, may have remainder mark or previous owner's name - GOOD PAPERBACK Standard-sized. Nº de ref. del artículo: M0813190150Z3
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Librería: Goodwill Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, Estados Unidos de America
Condición: good. Nº de ref. del artículo: 4CJH0200CDKW
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Reino Unido
Condición: Poor. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. Book Contains Pen & Pencil Markings In poor condition, suitable as a reading copy. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,450grams, ISBN:9780813190150. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9615599
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Galisteo Consulting Group Books, Albuquerque, NM, Estados Unidos de America
Softcover. Condición: Fine. "Like New" condition. A rigorous critique of traditional deterrence logic. Essential for scholars of nuclear policy and Cold War history. Clean, tight, and pristine. Used - like new. Ships from the USA. In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats. Nº de ref. del artículo: B330_70_24
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 225 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock. Nº de ref. del artículo: x-0813190150
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles