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Muthiah Alagappa is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center. He is the editor of Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, 2003), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, 2001), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, 1998), and Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, 1995).

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Coercion and Governance

Stanford University Press

Contents

List of Tables and Figures...........................................................................................................viiList of Acronyms and Abbreviations...................................................................................................ixPreface..............................................................................................................................xvAcknowledgments......................................................................................................................xixContributors.........................................................................................................................xxiiiIntroduction Muthiah Alagappa.......................................................................................................1PART I. CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE1. Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework Muthiah Alagappa....................................................29PART II. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL2. Japan: From Containment to Normalization Eiichi Katahara.........................................................................693. India: The New Militaries Sunil Dasgupta.........................................................................................92PART III. CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL4. South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control Jinsok Jun................................................................1215. Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges Chih-cheng Lo...................................................................................143PART IV. TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL6. The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil Eva-Lotta E. Hedman...............................................................1657. Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations James Ockey..........................................................1878. Bangladesh: An Uneasy Accommodation Amena Mohsin.................................................................................2099. Indonesia: On a New Course? Geoffrey Robinson....................................................................................226PART V. ETHNIC AND DOMINANT PARTY CIVILIAN CONTROL10. Malaysia: A Congruence of Interests K. S. Nathan and Geetha Govindasamy.........................................................25911. Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion Tan Tai Yong...................................................................................27612. Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence and Civil-Military Relations Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake.....................294PART VI. COMMUNIST AND TOTALITARIAN CIVILIAN CONTROL13. China: Conditional Compliance James Mulvenon....................................................................................31714. Vietnam: From Revolutionary Heroes to Red Entrepreneurs Thaveeporn Vasavakul....................................................33615. North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention Chung-in Moon and Hideshi Takesada.........................................357PART VII. MILITARY CONTROL OF THE STATE16. Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism Babar Sattar..................................................................................38517. Burma: Soldiers as State Builders Mary P. Callahan..............................................................................413PART VIII. CONCLUSION18. Asian Civil-Military Relations: Key Developments, Explanations, and Trajectories Muthiah Alagappa...............................433Notes................................................................................................................................499Bibliography.........................................................................................................................529Index................................................................................................................................575

Chapter One

Muthiah Alagappa

Covenants without swords are but words. -Thomas Hobbes

Monopoly over the legitimate use of force is as essential a characteristic of the state as compulsory jurisdiction and continuous organization in a given territorial area. -Max Weber

An armed, disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society. -Edmund Burke

The wonder ... is not why [the military] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them. -Samuel Finer

A central paradox of the modern state-and its quintessential civil-military relations problem-is how to create a military strong enough to protect the nation-state from external and internal threats but at the same time prevent it from dominating the state or becoming an instrument for internal repression. Monopoly over coercion, as noted in the Introduction, is a defining feature of the modern state. The theoretical justification for this monopoly is the claim to sovereignty: supreme jurisdiction within territorial boundaries and decision-making autonomy in international affairs. In functional terms, monopoly over coercion is deemed essential for ensuring domestic sociopolitical order, for protecting the political community (its ideals, autonomy, and territorial integrity) from external threats, and for creating an international environment conducive to the fulfillment of national goals and purposes. The concentration of the ultimate means of violence in a single institution, however, endows that institution with enormous brute power that can be deployed to dominate the state, curb liberty, or serve partisan purposes.

The conflicting demands of creating a potent institution and preventing it from dominating the state are resolved in the abstract by treating coercion and its institutional containers as instruments of state policy under the direction of a legitimate civilian government. Further, based on the assumption that the state is internally pacified, the military's primary role is deemed to be in the international arena. Although the military's role and its relationship to the government may differ with the political system, in the logic of the modern state the military is at bottom an instrument of the state and subordinate to a legitimate government that is accountable to its citizens. However, practice often departs, at times radically, from this ideal.

To begin with, there is no clear divide between domestic affairs and international affairs. In a number of states, including many in Asia, force is as much an instrument of policy in domestic affairs as it is in international affairs. Second, nonstate political groups often seek to acquire and deploy coercion in pursuit of goals that conflict with those of the state and the incumbent government. Consequently, the government's claim to monopoly over the means and use of coercion within territorial boundaries has seldom been realized. Third, governments themselves are not always legitimate. In fact, the development of a durable, legitimate political system is a major challenge confronting many Asian states (Alagappa 1995). Fourth, the military is not necessarily subordinate to government. Instead of serving as an instrument of state policy, in several countries the military intrudes into the political arena and in some cases dominates the state. Finally, the role of the military often extends beyond the matter of international security to include internal security as well as political and socioeconomic functions. With state coercion deployed for a variety of private, corporate, and partisan purposes, militaries have engaged in activities ranging from political domination of the state to participation in commerce to extortion and smuggling. In the process, militaries have robbed, persecuted, and killed the very people it is their duty to protect. For many countries, therefore, the civil-military problem arising from the concentration of force in the state is a serious concern.

The nature of this problem, as noted in the Introduction, and its management vary widely from country to country-at times even within a country depending on the issue and the level of government. The military, for example, may have a low political profile but nevertheless control security policymaking, exercise autonomy over its own institutional matters, and have access to extrabudgetary revenue. Similarly, it may be subject to civilian control at the national level but not at the provincial level. Moreover, the military-civilian relationship is dynamic. Contestation over the basis for political legitimacy, economic growth and development (or the lack thereof), and changes in the international context, among other forces, affect the interests, power, and beliefs of civilian and military leaders and can alter the content and pattern of civil-military interactions. Civil-military relations in Asia, as in other developing countries, are complex and dynamic and subject to periodic negotiation and change, at times through confrontation and violence.

The term "civil-military relations" implies a sharp dichotomy between two sharply bounded and coherent institutions. This is not the case in practice. Except in autocracies, the civil comprises many actors. And although the military may be more cohesive, better organized, and hierarchical, there may be several military actors because of factionalism, interservice rivalry, and other considerations. There are cleavages within each component, too, as well as linkages and alliances across the civil-military divide. Civil-military interaction, moreover, is not always antagonistic and focused on control. Description and analysis of civil-military relations must be nuanced and sensitive to these possibilities.

This chapter develops an analytical framework for investigating and explaining change in civil-military relations in Asia. Although the term "civil" comprises political and civil societies as well, for reasons advanced earlier the focus of this study is the relationship of the military as an institution to the political and administrative institutions of the state. Political, civil, and international societies are elements in this framework as well, depending on their impact on the state-soldier interaction. The chapter is organized in three parts. The first develops a framework for investigating change. The framework seeks to identify change in civil-military interaction through alterations in the breadth of military participation in governance (scope) and decision-making power (jurisdiction) and deploys the combination of these two indicators to ascertain if civilian (or military) supremacy is on the rise or decline. The second section critically reviews the major propositions that have been advanced in the study of civil-military relations with a view to identifying key building blocks for a comprehensive explanatory framework. The focus in this section is on three issues pertinent to this inquiry: military intervention and nonintervention in politics, problems of military rule and military exit from politics, and civil-military interaction in the postauthoritarian phase. The final part elaborates on the two major propositions advanced in the Introduction. One, the significance and weight of coercion in governance is the key to explaining long-term change and continuity in civil-military relations. And second, specific developments in civil-military relations are best explained by the interaction of the interests, power, and beliefs of the civilian and military institutions mediated by the influence of civil society and the international community.

INVESTIGATING CHANGE: JURISDICTION, SCOPE, AND SUPREMACY

Investigations of change must answer three questions: Change from what? What is the content and direction of change? And how is change to be measured? Change can only be investigated with reference to a baseline-a set of initial conditions. In this book, the baseline is the state of civil-military relations at the founding moment: independence from colonial rule (Philippines 1946, India 1947, Pakistan 1947, Sri Lanka 1948, Burma 1948, North Korea 1948, South Korea 1948, Malaysia 1957), founding revolution (Republic of China 1912 and 1949, Thailand 1932, Vietnam 1945, Indonesia 1949, People's Republic of China 1949), liberation from American occupation (Japan 1952), or separation or secession (Singapore 1965, Bangladesh 1971). This baseline is significant for two reasons. First, for most states it marks the formal break with traditional and colonial rule and the beginning of the effort to construct a modern nation-state. (This does not mean, of course, that features of traditional and colonial rule ceased to exist at that moment.) Second, the baseline provides a sufficiently long time horizon-four or five decades-making it possible to distinguish durable change from interludes and to discern patterns and trends. Because it is impossible to cover every change over a period of four or five decades, in each country study the focus is on key turning points or defining moments in state-soldier relations.

Civil-military interaction can vary along two dimensions: scope and jurisdiction. Scope indicates the breadth of military participation in governance. This participation may range from narrow concerns over institutional matters to broad political and social goals (Colton 1978: 6365; Pion-Berlin 1992: 8486; Trinkunas 2000). Though important, scope does not reveal the true nature of military participation in governance and may, in fact, be misleading. Military involvement in internal security and socioeconomic development, for example, does not necessarily constitute role expansion. For the latter to be the case, an increase in scope must be accompanied by a change in jurisdiction-the power to make decisions-in such matters. If the military itself decided on these roles or coerced the government into authorizing them, one might argue a case of role expansion and an increase in the military's influence. Such a case cannot be argued, however, if the civilian government authorized these roles on its own and retains the power to retract them. Engagement in internal security and developmental roles might well have the consequence of increasing the military's power and influence, which in turn could affect the power to make decisions. The crucial indicator, however, is a change in jurisdiction, irrespective of how it came about. The key point is this: the combination of jurisdiction and scope provides a good basis for ascertaining the content of civil-military interaction and whether the civilian (or the military) role and supremacy are on the rise or decline. Civilian supremacy is the ability of a government to conduct general policy free of military interference and to set the limits of military role and behavior. The three concepts-jurisdiction, scope, and civilian supremacy-are elaborated next.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction refers to the authority to make and implement policy. It is possible to distinguish two types of jurisdiction: ultimate and divided. An institution with ultimate jurisdiction has overall responsibility and is the final authority deciding policy. It may delegate decision-making power over specified issues to others. It may also determine the rules that should be followed in exercising delegated power and how oversight is to be achieved. Although ultimate jurisdiction does not imply exclusive control over decision making, this is sometimes the case. In divided jurisdiction, policymaking power is divided among institutions by issue and even within an issue area, with each institution exercising ultimate authority within the defined area. The security issue area, for example, may be the preserve of the military, although it defers to civilian authority in other matters. Even within the security issue area, the military may have ultimate jurisdiction only over certain issues. In Thailand before the mid-1990s, for example, the military controlled Burma and Cambodia policy while deferring to civilian authority on other security matters. Divided jurisdiction is most likely during periods of political transition.

Jurisdictional boundaries, therefore, may vary across issue areas and over time-especially in states undergoing political and economic change. In postauthoritarian states, for example, civilian authority to make policy may initially be limited to the political arena, whereas the military retains control over security and other functions as well as institutional matters. In time, jurisdictional boundaries may shift according to the success of the competing institutions in mobilizing support and increasing their store of power, and in due course altering the normative beliefs of society in matters of governance, including the role of the military. Even in states not undergoing regime change, jurisdictional boundaries may alter along with changes in specific circumstances or the military's mission. In communist states, for example, moments of leadership succession may increase the military's political salience, whereas periods of consolidated political leadership may diminish it. In democratic states, likewise, growing internal turmoil and the involvement of the armed forces in maintaining law and order may lead to an increase in the military's jurisdiction over internal security policy. Assessments of civil-military relations, therefore, must take a close look at jurisdictional change in critical areas of governance.

Scope

Scope, as noted, refers to the breadth of military participation in governance. The aspects of governance in which there is military involvement-and whether the involvement is broadening or narrowing-are among the issues that should be investigated. Five areas are crucial here: the structure of political domination and the military's place in it; the control, organization, and management of the military as an institution; security policymaking; the military's socioeconomic role; and the military's engagement in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trafficking. Military participation in governance is at its broadest when the military dominates politics; it is narrowest when limited to purely institutional matters. Participation in socioeconomic and illegal activities is often a means to political and institutional ends rather than a goal in its own right. The content of these five areas of governance and the questions to be investigated are elaborated below.

Political Participation. Politics is about using power and influence to dominate the state and make policy on its behalf. The military's place in the structure of political domination is the starting point for investigations of civil-military relations. It determines, in large measure, the scope and jurisdiction of military participation in other areas of governance as well. Of particular interest here are the military's weight in political governance, the form of its participation in politics, and its self-conception.

With regard to the military's political salience, inquiry should focus on the importance of coercion and the military's role in sustaining the political system. The key question is whether the survival and functioning of the incumbent government-and, by extension, the political system-are predicated on military support and acquiescence. If the government is legitimate and can stand on its own with coercion playing only a limited, indirect, and supportive role in the domestic and international politics of the state, then the military is likely to have little political clout. Its role in governance-including the arrangements for organizing and managing the military-will be determined in large measure by the civilian government. The military will be confined to providing professional advice and lobbying for its interests through defined institutions and procedures under the control of civilian authority. If coercion is a highly visible and consequential factor in governance, however, military support is likely to be crucial for the government's survival and functioning-in which case it is necessary to investigate the degree and nature of dependence, the political power and influence that accrues to the military from such dependence, how that power and influence are utilized, and whether the military's importance is increasing or decreasing. Constitutional and legal provisions, as well as interviews with officials, are a good starting point for inquiry but may not reveal the whole story. Often it is necessary to investigate actual military participation-its type and extent-at the national and provincial levels as well as the means employed by the military in seeking to exercise influence (Giddens 1987: 249; Colton 1978: 6465).

Military participation in "councils of government" may range from backing a civilian government to dominating the state. Four types of participation may be distinguished: referee, guardian, participant-ruler, and praetorian rule. If the military has the ability to decisively alter the distribution of power, it can act as a referee among competing political groups; in this role the military may not be part of the government, but has the power to influence which civilian group governs and to define its decision-making powers. In the guardian role as well, the military may not be a direct participant in government; in this role the military, with the power to intervene and displace governments that stray from "national ideals," may back a specific government on ethnic, class, or ideological grounds. In the participant-ruler category, the military is a direct participant in government; it may be a junior or equal partner occupying positions of authority in governing councils at the national, regional, and local levels; it is likely to have ultimate jurisdiction in specified areas. In the final category-praetorian rule-the military is the dominant player and has ultimate authority in all areas of governance. There are different types of military regimes. The most extensive is that which seeks to perpetuate military rule through the creation of a single-party structure. Although the military regime is the most extreme form of military participation in politics, there is no strict hierarchy among the others. A military in a guardian role may well be politically more powerful than a military in the participant-ruler category. The utility of these categories is primarily to demonstrate the type of participation and secondarily to indicate, in a general way, whether participation is on the rise or decline.

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