Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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9780801478062: Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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Jervis, Robert
Editorial: Cornell University Press (2011)
ISBN 10: 0801478065 ISBN 13: 9780801478062
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Descripción Cornell University Press, 2011. PAP. Estado de conservación: New. New Book.Shipped from US within 10 to 14 business days. Established seller since 2000. Nº de ref. de la librería IB-9780801478062

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Jervis, Robert
Editorial: University of North Carolina Press
ISBN 10: 0801478065 ISBN 13: 9780801478062
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Descripción University of North Carolina Press. Estado de conservación: New. Brand New. Nº de ref. de la librería 0801478065

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Jervis, Robert
Editorial: Cornell University Press, United States (2011)
ISBN 10: 0801478065 ISBN 13: 9780801478062
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Descripción Cornell University Press, United States, 2011. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. 229 x 155 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis s findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community s performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis s conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.In Jervis s estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider s perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. Nº de ref. de la librería AAC9780801478062

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Jervis, Robert
Editorial: Cornell University Press, United States (2011)
ISBN 10: 0801478065 ISBN 13: 9780801478062
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Descripción Cornell University Press, United States, 2011. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. 229 x 155 mm. Language: English . Brand New Book. The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis s findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community s performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis s conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.In Jervis s estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider s perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. Nº de ref. de la librería AAC9780801478062

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Jervis, Robert
ISBN 10: 0801478065 ISBN 13: 9780801478062
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Jervis, Robert
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Descripción Cornell University Press. PAPERBACK. Estado de conservación: New. 0801478065 Brand New Book. Ships from the United States. 30 Day Satisfaction Guarantee!. Nº de ref. de la librería 15897620

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Descripción Cornell University Press 2012-01, 2012. Estado de conservación: New. Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is 24-48 hours from our warehouse. Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely. Nº de ref. de la librería NU-ING-00883678

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Descripción Cornell University Press. PAPERBACK. Estado de conservación: New. 0801478065. Nº de ref. de la librería Z0801478065ZN

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Jervis, Robert
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Descripción Cornell University Press, 2011. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Nº de ref. de la librería 0801478065

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Jervis, Robert
Editorial: Cornell University Press
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Descripción Cornell University Press. Paperback. Estado de conservación: New. Paperback. 248 pages. Dimensions: 9.0in. x 6.1in. x 0.8in.The U. S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jerviss findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence communitys performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jerviss conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanationsanalysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blindwere also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jerviss estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insiders perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. This item ships from multiple locations. Your book may arrive from Roseburg,OR, La Vergne,TN. Paperback. Nº de ref. de la librería 9780801478062

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