Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Empirical Findings: 22 (Theory and Decision Library B, 22) - Tapa dura

 
9780792319047: Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Empirical Findings: 22 (Theory and Decision Library B, 22)
Tapa dura
ISBN 10: 0792319044 ISBN 13: 9780792319047
Editorial: Springer, 1992

Sinopsis

As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don’t depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). "The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation"; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). "General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales"; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). "Infonnation as an Economic Commodity"; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).

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Reseña del editor

As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). "The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation"; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). "General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales"; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). "Infonnation as an Economic Commodity"; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).

Reseña del editor

This volume collects the best work representative of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Thirteen articles present extensions and alternatives to expected utility theory explaining behavior in and out of the laboratory, including activity in financial markets, crimes of passion, and the Ellsberg paradox.
These contributions on the theory of individual behavior are complemented by five studies reporting the design, execution, and implications of experiments that test alternative theories. Finally, the implications of the interaction of individuals under risk and uncertainty in markets and negotiation are explored in ten papers. Throughout, the approach taken reflects the multidisciplinary nature of the research.
The contributors include economists, psychologists, statisticians, and management scientists, each writing to make their work critically comprehensible to the wider audience.

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Editorial
Springer
Año de publicación
1992
Idioma
Inglés
ISBN 10 
0792319044
ISBN 13 
9780792319047
Encuadernación
Tapa dura
Número de páginas
276
Editor
Geweke J.
Contacto del fabricante
ProductSafety@springernature.com
ProductSafety@springernature.com

Poststr. 9
Darmstadt
64293
Alemania

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9789401052610: Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Empirical Findings: 22 (Theory and Decision Library B)

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ISBN 10:  9401052611 ISBN 13:  9789401052610
Editorial: Springer, 2012
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